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Introduction 
Entrepreneurship among foreigners is often considered a consequence of 
discrimination in salaried work or social exclusion. However, entrepreneurship among 
foreigners may result from their diverse entrepreneurial skills, which contribute to 
economic growth and job creation in the host country. Thus, it is important to 
understand the entrepreneurial behavior of foreigners. 
In the first chapter, we study how countries of origin affect foreigners’ choice 
between salaried work and entrepreneurship upon arrival to the host country. We find 
that foreigners from countries that are more dissimilar to the host country and those 
from wealthier countries are more likely engage in entrepreneurship upon arrival. In 
addition, we use a change in the Portuguese immigration law to evaluate the effect of 
a reduction in regulations on entrepreneurship upon the probability of engagement in 
entrepreneurship upon arrival. Foreigners from countries outside the European 
Economic Area, who are subject to legal requirements that those from countries 
within this area are not, are less likely to engage in entrepreneurship upon arrival than 
those from countries within this area. Our findings suggest that reducing these legal 
requirements may encourage foreigners to engage in entrepreneurship upon arrival, 
although not significantly. 
In the second chapter, we study transitions from salaried work to 
entrepreneurship. We find that foreign individuals are less likely than natives to leave 
salaried work to engage in entrepreneurship. According to our results, the opportunity 
cost of leaving salaried work is higher for foreigners than it is for natives. We find 
that individuals from countries that are more dissimilar from the host country have 
higher probabilities of switching to entrepreneurship. We also find that individuals 
from less developed countries are more likely to switch to entrepreneurship the 
wealthier their country of origin is, while for those from countries more developed 
than the host country the opposite occurs. 
The third chapter addresses the survival of firms created by foreign 
entrepreneurs. We find that these firms survive less than comparable firms created by 
natives. Foreigners from countries that are more dissimilar to the host country are 
more likely to survive than those coming from countries that are relatively similar. 
Likewise, those from wealthier countries are more likely to survive. 
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Entrepreneurship among recently arrived immigrants: the 





We study how countries of origin affect foreign individuals’ choice between 
salaried work and entrepreneurship upon arrival to the host country. Using a change 
in the Portuguese immigration law we evaluate the impact of reducing regulations on 
entrepreneurship upon the probability of foreign individuals choose entrepreneurship 
upon arrival. We find that foreigners from countries more dissimilar to the host 
country and those from wealthier countries are more likely engage in entrepreneurship 
upon arrival than those from similar countries. Foreigners from countries outside the 
European Economic Area, who have to fulfil requirements that are not required to 
those from countries within this area, are less likely to enter the labor market as 
entrepreneurs than those from countries within this area. According to our findings 
reducing legal requirements to foreign entrepreneurship may encourage foreigners to 





The number of foreign individuals has increased in several countries. Foreign-
born people living in OECD countries accounted for 9% of total population in 
2009/2010, which represents an increase of 33% relative to 2000/2001 (OECD, 
2012). Therefore, the integration of foreigners in the host country arises as an 
important question. Immigrants face obstacles to their integration in host countries, 
which arise in several areas, such as in the labor market, housing (Ahmeda & 
Hammarstedtb, 2007), health care access, education or credit markets (OECD, 2012); 
(Chan et al., 2005). 
One factor creating obstacles to integration is unfamiliarity. Unfamiliarity is 
two-sided: foreigners are unfamiliar with the host country and local actors are 
unfamiliar with foreigners. For example, foreigners may not have the necessary 
knowledge on employment legislation or practices concerning job search or the 
workplace while employers may not be able to properly assess the value of 
foreigners’ qualifications and skills. Therefore, the skills of foreigners may not be 
fully transferrable to the host country, which may hinder their opportunities in the 
labor market and thus create obstacles to their integration. For example, western 
countries are the ones that usually set the standards for the recognition and 
accreditation of occupations and these standards end up improving the mobility of 
western skilled workers while limiting the mobility of non-western workers (Iredale, 
2002). Discrimination against foreigners is not uncommon (Mayda, 2006) and 
represents another obstacle to integration in the host country. For instance, foreigners 
with strong ethnic identities may have a lower probability of being employed (Bisin et 
al., 2011). 
Several studies have looked to how foreigners fare in the host country labor 
market. Evidence suggests that foreigners have obstacles in the labor market of the 
host country. Foreigners may face obstacles in finding jobs and often employment 
rates of foreigners are lower than those of natives (OECD, 2012). Foreigners are 
found to have a wage gap relative to natives (Chiswick, 1978; Friedberg, 2000). 
Entrepreneurship may be an alternative for the integration of foreigners’ in the host 
country, in particular of those who face more obstacles in paid employment (Portes & 
Zhou, 1996). Self-employment rates among foreigners are often found to be higher 
than the ones of natives (Yuengert, 1995; Li, 2001; Clark & Drinkwater, 1998). 
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However, foreigners’ engagement in entrepreneurship in the host country may also be 
subject to obstacles arising from differences between home and host countries. 
Differences between home and host countries may contribute to a higher unfamiliarity 
with the host country and to greater discrimination against foreigners. 
We address the following questions. What is the impact of relaxing legal 
constraints concerning the entry of foreigners into entrepreneurship upon their choice 
to enter the labor market? Which foreigners more likely to enter as paid employees 
and as entrepreneurs? What is the impact of home countries characteristics upon 
foreigners’ decision to enter the labor market? We consider foreign individuals that 
enter the Portuguese labor market for the first time between 2002 and 2009, whether 
as paid workers or as entrepreneurs and we study how countries of origin affect the 
choice of foreigners concerning entry in the labor market. Using a change in the 
Portuguese immigration law we evaluate the impact of a reduction in entry 
regulations upon the probability of foreign individuals enter the labor market as 
entrepreneurs. Portugal is a member of the European Economic Area, an area within 
witch individuals can move freely, and thus individuals whose country of origin 
belongs to this area are not affected by the change in the immigration law. Therefore, 
we compare foreign individuals arriving from countries within the European 
Economic Area with those from countries outside this area, concerning their choice 
between wage employment and entrepreneurship upon arrival to Portugal. Our data 
includes foreigners from over 60 nationalities. 
We find scant evidence that entrepreneurship among foreigners may be 
encouraged by a reduction in legal restrictions imposed to them. Countries of origin 
do affect individuals’ choice concerning entry into entrepreneurship upon arrival. 
This paper organized as follows. A review of previous research is presented in 
Section 2. In Section 3 we briefly characterize immigration on Portugal focusing on 
the period under analysis. Section 4 describes our data and estimation procedures. In 
Section 5 we discuss our results. Lastly, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Previous Research 
The integration of foreign individuals in the labor market is particularly 
relevant to achieve integration in the society of the host country. Obstacles to 
integration in the labor market may arise due to unfamiliarity and discrimination. 
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Foreigners’ unfamiliarity with the host country may prevent them from doing an 
effective job search.  Frijters et al. (2005) find that immigrants are less successful 
searching for jobs than natives. Foreigners may not be familiar with the language (of 
the host country) in which the employment ads are advertised or with labor market 
practices and legislation. They may resort to job search strategies that rely more on 
their personal networks but that may not be the most efficient ones to get a job 
(Battua et al., 2011). Local actors have imperfect information about immigrants’ 
abilities or qualifications and thus foreigners’ skills and qualifications may not be 
fully transferable to the labor market of the host country (Donohue, 2005). 
Discrimination against foreigners is also found to create obstacles to labor 
market integration. For instance, ethnic minorities are found to have employment 
rates that are lower than those of their majority counterparts (OECD, 2012). Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2004) sent resumes with randomized white and African-American 
sounding names to newspaper employment adds in the US and found that white 
names receive 50% more callbacks for interviews than African-American names. 
Moreover, they found that this gap holds across occupation, industry and employer 
size. Foreigners may not be able to obtain adequate returns on their skills in wage 
employment. Foreigners may have a wage gap relative to natives (Chiswick, 1978; 
Friedberg, 2000) and the jobs they are able to obtain may not be adequate. Across 
OECD countries, almost 15% of employed immigrants have temporary contracts, 
16% work in low-skilled jobs and 28.3% of the highly educated immigrants are 
overqualified for the jobs they hold. For natives these figures are 10%, 7% and 17.6% 
respectively (OECD, 2012).  
Entrepreneurship may be a way to overcome lack of integration in the host 
country, in particular for those facing more obstacles in salaried work (Clark & 
Drinkwater, 1998). Constant and Zimmerman (2006) find that, besides earnings, the 
feeling of being discriminated against is an additional factor leading immigrants to 
self-employment. By engaging in entrepreneurship, foreigners may take advantage of 
their skills while avoiding, at least partially, the problem of lack of skill transferability 
from home to host countries. Entrepreneurship can also be a mean to exploit 
advantages that foreigners may have over natives, such as those resulting from the 
identification of opportunities missed by natives. Such advantages can arise, for 
example, from serving markets related with their countries of origin (Zhou, 2004; 
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Drori et al., 2009), or from creativity benefits resulting from exposure to multicultural 
experiences, (Leung et al., 2008; Shi and Hoskisson, 2012).  
However, unfamiliarity and discrimination may also create obstacles to 
entrepreneurship among foreigners. Foreigners wishing to engage in entrepreneurship 
may lack the necessary knowledge to meet the preferences of the host market. As a 
consequence consumers may not buy their products (Kaynak & Kara, 2002; Balabanis 
et al., 2001), which decreases the likelihood of success of foreign entrepreneurs. 
Discrimination against foreigners by local consumers and local capital markets may 
also hinder the success of foreign entrepreneurs. Local consumers may consider the 
products supplied by foreigners to be worse than those supplied by natives (Nardinelli 
& Simon, 1990; Watson & Wright, 2000) and thus refuse to buy them. Investors are 
often biased towards local firms (French & Poterba, 1991) and thus may discriminate 
foreigners in capital markets (Bell et al., 2012) preventing them from obtaining 
appropriate financing in the host country. 
Several studies find evidence that foreigners assimilate in the host country 
over their stay, as they may learn about the host country and become more accepted in 
the society. Foreigners’ job search performance improves over their stay in the host 
country (Frijters et al., 2005). The wages of foreigners tend to increase and 
approximate those of natives over their stay in the host country (Chiswick, 1978), 
although wage penalties may persist over time (Cabral & Duarte, 2013). Foreigners 
are also more likely to engage in entrepreneurship as they assimilate (Borjas, 1986). 
Foreigners’ labor market choice upon arrival is likely to affect how they 
assimilate in the host country. Lofstrom (2002) finds that the earnings of self-
employed immigrants converge to the earnings of natives faster than the earning of 
immigrants in salaried work. Therefore, factors affecting foreigners’ labor market 
choice upon arrival, such as legal constraints on entrepreneurship, may have long run 
effects. Legal constraints on entrepreneurship affect the characteristics of foreigners 
who come to the host country, foreigners’ countries of origin (Borjas, 1994, Borjas, 
1992, Winkelmann, 1999) and the perceptions of natives about foreigners (Miller, 
1999). Thus, these legal constraints affect the performance of foreigners in the labor 
market (Baker & Benjamin, 1994, Bloom et al., 1995) and their assimilation in the 
host country. For example, countries that have a generous immigration policy and 
grant a considerable share of visas to asylum seekers and refugees tend to have low 
shares of labor market participation among immigrants (Bauer et al., 2001).  
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Foreigners are not all alike. Countries of origin shape individuals’ 
characteristics, beliefs and behaviors and also determine the regulations that 
foreigners are subject to in the labor market of host country. Barrett (1998) finds 
significant differences in the labor market quality of immigrants across countries. The 
author finds that the impact of the absence of labor market quality criteria in 
immigration policy in the US depends on immigrants’ country of origin. For countries 
of origin such as Mexico the consequence is an inflow of low skilled workers while 
for countries as Sweden or the Netherlands this does not hold, as immigrants from the 
later countries tend to be of higher quality regardless immigration criteria. 
Differences between home and host countries may aggravate the obstacles 
foreigners face in the labor market, both in salaried work and in entrepreneurship. On 
the one hand, these differences increase the difficulty of foreigners understand and 
adapt to the host country while, on the other hand, they also increase the difficulty of 
locals understand foreigners (Orr and Scott, 2008). Individuals from countries that are 
more dissimilar to the host country may experience greater unfamiliarity with the host 
country as well as greater discrimination against them. 
In the host country we study, differences between home and host countries 
will determine which foreigners may or may nor enter freely into the labor market, 
since Portugal is a member of the European Economic Area, an area that allows free 
movement of individuals. In particular, individuals from countries outside the 
European Economic Area wishing to engage in entrepreneurship have to fulfill legal 
requirements that to those from countries within this area do not. Regulations on entry 
into entrepreneurship increase the cost of entry or may even prevent it. As a 
consequence, these regulations reduce entry into self- employment (Prantl & Spitz-
Oener, 2009) and hamper the creation of new firms (Klappera et al., 2006). Ardagna 
and Lusardi (2008) find that those not able to find jobs or those pursuing business 
opportunities are less likely to become entrepreneurs in countries with high levels of 
regulation on entry into entrepreneurship. A reduction in this type of entry costs is 
found to increase the likelihood of entry into entrepreneurship  (Bruhn, 2011; Kaplan 
et al., 2011; Ardagna & Lusardi, 2008; Rostam-Afschar, 2013), which in turn may 
lead to an increase in the number of firms and in employment (Branstetter et al., 
2013). 
Studying foreigners’ labor market decision concerning salaried work or 
entrepreneurship upon arrival, and how countries of origin influence these decisions 
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may thus provide useful insights concerning their future integration in the labor 
market of the host country.  
 
3. Immigration in Portugal: Trends and Law  
Immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon in Portugal. Foreign 
individuals represented 1.2% of the population in 1992 while in the period between 
2002-2009 this figure was around 4% (Sources: Statistics Portugal, Serviço de 
Estrangeiros e Fronteiras, PORDATA). Portuguese speaking African countries were 
traditional sources of immigration into Portugal representing 45% of foreigners in the 
country in 2002. In the following years, the countries of origin of new immigrants 
became more diverse. Brazil increased its importance, accounting for 13.9% of 
foreigners in 2007 compared to 10.4% in 2002. Eastern European countries emerged 
as important sources of immigrants. The share of Ukrainian individuals rose from 
0.1% in 2002 to 8.5% in 2007. Likewise, those from Romania and Moldova 
accounted for a joint share of 0.3% in 2002 that increased to 7.1% in 2007. The share 
of individuals from countries within the European Economic Area decreased from 
28% in 2002 to 23% in 2007 (Statistics Portugal). 
Immigration in Portugal is greatly driven by labor market opportunities and 
employment rates of immigrants that recently arrived to Portugal are usually high. 
The 2004/2005 average employment rate for immigrants in Portugal for less than five 
years is 81.7% for men and 56.5% for women, which are in both cases higher than 
those of natives (OECD, 2008). 
Immigrants have also engaged in entrepreneurship in Portugal. The number of 
foreign entrepreneurs increased from 4000 in 1998-2000 to 7000 in 2007-2008, while, 
in the same period, the number of native entrepreneurs decreased from 74000 to 
42000. The self-employment rate of foreigners is usually below the one of natives. In 
the period 2005-2006 self-employment rates of foreigners and natives were 12.1% 
and 19.3% respectively. However, self-employed foreigners are more likely to 
employ paid labor than self-employed natives (OECD, 2008). Employees in firms 
owned by foreigners account for 4.7% of employment in the firms of all entrepreneurs 
in 1998-2000 and 5.7% in 2007-2008 (OECD, 2011). This suggests that foreign 
entrepreneurs’ contribution to employment creation in not negligible. 
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Portugal is a member of the European Economic Area and thus entry into 
entrepreneurship is subject to different regulations for immigrants from the European 
Economic Area and for those outside this area. Immigrants from the European 
Economic Area have very few restrictions, while those outside this area are subject to 
a more stringent immigration law (see Oliveira (2010) for more detail). Between 2002 
and 2006 no changes occurred in the Portuguese immigration law. The admission of 
immigrants to undertake salaried work in Portugal was contingent on the existence of 
employment opportunities. Priority in the fulfillment of employment opportunities 
was given to Portuguese citizens, those from the European Union, Economic 
European Area and countries with which Portugal has agreements of free movement 
of people, and immigrants already residing in Portugal. There were four types of work 
visas, according to the type of activities the immigrant was going to work on: sports, 
show business, services and salaried work. To apply for work visas immigrants had to 
have a work contract, means of subsistence, access to housing, be registered in the 
social security, a proof of their fiscal situation, and allow the consultation of their 
criminal record. The initial period for immigrants undertake salaried work could not 
exceed two years; in the case of seasonal work it would be 6 months for each 12 
months period. 
Immigrants were only allowed to engage in entrepreneurial activities under 
two legal statuses: residence permit and a work visa specific for independent 
activities. The way to obtain these legal statuses depends on whether individuals were 
arriving to the country or if they were already working in Portugal under other 
statuses. To obtain a residence permit allowing them to engage in entrepreneurial 
activities, those entering the country had to have means of subsistence, access to 
housing and to provide one document proving the registration of an investment 
operation in Portugal and one document certifying that the individual was qualified to 
do it. If a specific skill was required, immigrants had to apply for recognition of their 
qualifications. This means that immigrants had first to establish their entrepreneurial 
activities in Portugal in order to request the residence visa to engage in such activities. 
To do so, they could request a short-term visa with the purpose of setting up their 
businesses or have someone already with residence in Portugal to represent them. To 
apply for a work visa for independent activities, immigrants had to prove they hold a 
promise to contract service provision and that they were qualified to do the activity 
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involved in the service provision. Proof of qualification had to be done with a 
declaration from the respective professional order. 
Those who were already working in Portugal had to change the type of visa 
they held in order to be able to engage in entrepreneurial activities. To do so they had 
two options: to wait between 3 to 5 years before and then convert their visas into 
residence permits or they could leave the country and request a type III visa or a 
residence visa in a Portuguese consulate in their countries of origin. Those who were 
working in Portugal with a stay permit were particularly restricted, as they had to 
work uninterruptedly for 5 years in order to convert their status into a residence 
permit. This was the case of many Ukrainian and Brazilian individuals, which 
represented a considerable share of workers with stay permits. 
In 2007 the Portuguese immigration law was changed. A single residence visa 
was created, which was granted according to the purpose of immigrants’ stay in 
Portugal (for example, salaried work, independent activities or research). The 
admission of immigrants to undertake salaried work in Portugal did not change 
notably with the new law. However, for the first time, the law explicitly recognized 
entrepreneurial activities as a specific purpose of immigrants coming to Portugal. As 
in the previous law, immigrant wishing to come to Portugal to engage in 
entrepreneurship had to have means of subsistence and access to housing. However, 
they are not forced to establish their businesses prior coming to Portugal anymore. 
Requirements are now to provide evidence of investments already made in Portugal 
or that they have the intention to invest and the necessary financial resources in 
Portugal to do so.  
Those already working in Portugal could change to an entrepreneurial activity 
in two ways. First, as under the previous law, they could return to their countries of 
origin and request a residence visa to undertake an entrepreneurial activity. Second, 
unlike the previous law where they had to wait a minimum period to change their 
professional status, immigrants could make an application at the Portuguese 






4.1 – Data Source 
The source of our data is Quadros de Pessoal, a mandatory annual survey 
conducted by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment that covers all firms employing 
paid labor in Portugal. The dataset has information on all individuals working at each 
firm and includes their occupational status (employee or employer) and nationality. 
The longitudinal nature of the data allows us to follow individuals over time and thus 
identify when they first enter the Portuguese labor market. 
Our study uses a sample of foreigners that entered the Portuguese labor market 
for the first time in the years between 2002 and 2009, whether as salaried workers or 
as entrepreneurs. Our dataset starts in 1985 and thus we are able to identify which 
individuals appear for the first time in the data in the years between 2002 and 2009. 
We start in 2002 because information on nationalities is only available from this year 
onwards. We identify around 250 000 foreign individuals that entered the labor 
market in the period 2002-2009. Around 16 000 were from countries within the 
European Economic Area and 234 000 from countries outside this area.   
To study the effect of relaxing legal constraints concerning the entry of 
foreigners into entrepreneurship we use the change in the Portuguese immigration law 
occurred in 2007, which is described in the previous section. It is unclear what was 
the impact of this change in the year 2007, as it was enforced in August of that year. 
Moreover, in 2007 agents may not had the necessary time to adjust their decisions in 
response to the change in the law. Thus, to be on the safe side we exclude the year 
2007 from our sample and we focus on those individuals that entered the Portuguese 
labor market for the first time before and after the law was enforced: years 2005 to 
2006 and 2008 to 2009, respectively. In 2005/2006 around 37 000 foreign individuals 
entered the Portuguese labor market while this figure was around 50 000 in 
2008/2009. 
 
4.2 – Estimation 
To estimate the probability that foreigner individuals choose to enter the labor 
market as entrepreneurs we use a probit model, including individuals’ characteristics 
and variables accounting for differences between home and host countries. 
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To evaluate the effect of the change in the Portuguese immigration law we 
follow a differences-in-differences approach. We compare the probability of 
individuals entering the labor market as entrepreneurs before and after the change in 
the law for both those coming from countries outside the European Economic Area 
and those from within this area. Individuals from countries within the European 
Economic Area serve as a control group because are not affected by the change in the 
immigration law, as Portugal is a member of this area and this allows them to freely 
move to Portugal. 
To be on the safe side concerning the composition of the sample of foreigners 
entering Portugal before and after the change in the law as well as the composition of 
the sample of foreigners from the European Economic Area and those outside this 
area, we compare the probability of individuals entering the labor market as 
entrepreneurs before and after the change in the law using a propensity score 
matching model. That is, we define a control and a treatment group and select 
individuals of the control group who are similar to those in the treatment group. We 
considered two scenarios for the matching model. First, we seek to avoid cofounding 
effects arising from changes in the composition of immigrants coming to Portugal that 
may result rom the change in immigration law. Thus, we match the characteristics of 
individuals from each group (European Economic Area and outside this area) in 
2008/2009 to the characteristics of individuals in the same group in 2005/2006. That 
is, we want individuals who come to Portugal after the law to have similar 
characteristics to those arriving before the new law. We do not impose that 
individuals from the European Economic Area have characteristics similar to those 
outside this area. Our sample for this scenario is obtained with the following 
procedure. We estimate the probability that each individual is in the period 2005/2006 
using individuals’ characteristics: schooling, age and gender. This estimation is done 
separately for those from the European Economic Area and those outside this area. 
Using this estimation and individuals’ observed characteristics we predict the 
probability that each individual is in 2005/2006. Then, for each individual in 
2005/2006 we searched in 2008/2009 for the individual with the closest probability to 
the former, provided that the distance between these probabilities does no exceed a 
small value. This small value was 0.009, which was calculated based on the standard 
deviation of the estimated probabilities of being in the period 2005/2006. We obtained 
72 816 individuals with similar characteristics in 2005/2006 and 2008/2009: 67 278 
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individuals from outside the European Economic Area and 5 538 individuals from 
within this area. 
In the second scenario, we want to avoid confounding effects arising from 
differences in the characteristics of individuals from the European Economic Area 
and those outside this area. We want to consider as a control group those individuals 
from the European Economic Area that have characteristics similar to those from 
outside this area, before and after the change in the law. Here we do not impose that 
individuals within each group in 2005/2006 have characteristics similar to individuals 
within the same group in 2008/2009. To select individuals to our sample for this 
scenario, we estimate the probability that each individual is from outside the 
European Economic Area using individual characteristics: schooling, age and gender. 
The estimation is done separately for 2005/2006 and for 2008/2009. With this 
estimation and individuals’ observed characteristics we predicted the probabilities of 
individuals come from outside the European Economic Area. For each individual 
from countries outside the European Economic Area, we then searched among those 
from this area for the one having the probability that is closest to the former, provided 
that the distance between these probabilities does no exceed a small value. This value 
was 0.01 and it was calculated based on the standard deviation of estimated 
probabilities of being from outside the European Economic Area. We obtained 12 218 
individuals comparable across both groups: 5 706 in 2005/2006 and 6 512 in 
2008/2009. 
 
4.3 – Variables 
Our dependent variable is a binary variable taking the value 1 if an individual 
entered the labor market as an entrepreneur and 0 if he entered as a paid worker. 
We include the following individual characteristics: gender, education and 
age. Gender is accounted for with a dummy variable equal to 1 for males and 0 for 
females. Education is measured by individuals’ schooling years. Individuals’ age is 
directly reported in our dataset. 
To account for differences between home and host countries we use national 
culture, political institutions and the level of economic development. We measure 
cultural distance between home and host countries with four cultural dimensions: 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and masculinity (Hofstede, 
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2001). To aggregate this dimensions into a single measure we use Kogut and Singh 







where 𝐼!" is the distance score for the ith dimension and jth country, 𝑉! is the variance 
of the score of ith dimension, P stands for Portugal and 𝐶𝐷! is the national distance 
between the jth country and Portugal. 
To measure political distance between home and host countries we use a 
measure by (Berry et al., 2010) that aggregates five dimensions: policy-making 
uncertainty (institutional actors with veto power), the size of the state (as a percentage 
of GDP), a democracy score, whether or not countries are WTO members, and if they 
belong to the same trading block. In countries with high levels of political uncertainty 
policies may change in a subjective manner, as these countries are often associated 
with governments with low democracy levels, few institutional constraints, high 
levels of state ownership and lack of credibility (Murtha & Lenway, 1994; Henisz, 
2000). This makes it more difficult for foreigners to anticipate such changes and thus 
to adapt to them. Close political ties often support commercial relations, which in turn 
potentiate the exchange of information. Consequently, foreigners from countries with 
which the host country maintains commercial relations may be more familiar with the 
host country than those from countries that lack these relations (Brewer, 2007). This 
measure of political distance is only available until 2007 and thus for the years 2008 
and 2009 we assume that each country had the same political distance to Portugal as 
in 2007. 
Countries’ level of development is measured with GDP per capita in constant 
prices of 2000 adjusted for purchasing power parity, obtained from the United 
Nations World Development Indicators Database. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 – Entry in the Portuguese Labor Market 
Table 1 displays sample averages of individual characteristics of foreigners 
coming from countries within the European Economic Area and those from countries 
outside this area. Individuals from countries within the European Economic Area are 
on average older, more educated and represented by a higher share of women than 
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those from countries outside this area. Individuals from countries within the European 
Economic Area are, on average, culturally more distant from Portuguese than those 
coming from countries outside this area. Not surprisingly, countries within the 
European Economic Area are politically more similar to Portugal and have a higher 
GDPpc than countries outside this area. 
 
Table 1. Sample Averages: 2002 - 2009 
  EEA No EEA t Statistic 
Age 34.821 31.674 41.837 
Schooling Years 10.364 6.581 102.303 
Male 0.580 0.602 -5.279 
Cultural Distance 71.095 19.296 318.78 
Political Distance 0.870 1.291 -57.392 
GDPpc 21 900.450 3 553.551 137.505 
Number of Observations 15 438 144 274  
 
Table 2 has sample averages for those entering the labor market as 
entrepreneurs. Individuals entering by entrepreneurship are older, culturally more 
different and wealthier than those that enter as workers and this holds for those 
outside and within the European Economic Area.  However, while individuals from 
the EEA that enter through entrepreneurship are less educated, with a higher share of 
males coming from countries with higher political distance compared to those 
entering as workers, for individuals from countries outside the EEA the opposite 
happens. 
 
Table 2. Sample Averages: labor market entries through entrepreneurship 
  EEA No EEA t Statistic 
Age 43.086 35.770 20.912 
Schooling Years 9.668 7.790 9.766 
Male 0.704 0.605 5.729 
Cultural Distance 86.113 26.428 47.495 
Political Distance 0.759 1.667 -24.240 
GDPpc 23 772.040 5 255.995 24.506 
Number of Observations 1 276 1 888  
 
Table 3 displays the number of foreign individuals that entered the Portuguese 
labor market between 2002 and 2009. Most foreigners come from countries outside 
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the European Economic Area. However, the share of those from countries outside the 
European Economic Area entering as entrepreneurs is considerably lower than that of 
foreigners from that area. The share of entrepreneurs among those from the European 
Economic Area does show a clear pattern over time, going from 10.2% to 16.7% 
between 2002 and 2003 but then remaining around 12% to 14% in the following 
years. A clearer pattern emerges from the figures concerning the share of 
entrepreneurs among those from outside the European Economic Area. This share has 
been increasing in particular from 2005 onwards, that is, before the new immigration 
law was enforced. 
 
Table 3. Entries in the Labor Market by Year 
  EEA No EEA 
	  	   Entrepreneurs Workers % Entrep. Entrepreneurs Workers % Entrep. 
2002 176 1551 0.102 304 38588 0.008 
2003 231 1149 0.167 230 23518 0.010 
2004 188 1317 0.125 255 19812 0.013 
2005 234 1651 0.124 337 20925 0.016 
2006 212 1391 0.132 376 16275 0.023 
2007 241 1705 0.124 481 19330 0.024 
2008 277 1684 0.141 683 28712 0.023 
2009 201 1397 0.126 481 18655 0.025 
 
Figure 1 shows the number of individuals entering the Portuguese labor 
market by country of origin. We only display the top twenty countries with the largest 
number of individuals coming to the Portuguese labor market between 2002 and 2009 
(see Table 11 in the appendix for a complete set of countries of origin of individuals 
coming to the Portuguese labor market). The share of individuals that enter the 
Portuguese labor market through entrepreneurship tends to be higher among those 
from countries within the European Economic Area than among those outside this 
area. Countries accounting for higher inflows are not necessarily those that contribute 
the most for foreign entrepreneurship upon arrival. Accounting for considerable 




Figure 1. Labor Market Entries by Country 
 
Results of our first regressions are reported in Table 4. These regressions 
include a dummy variable indicating whether individuals entering the labor market 
come from countries outside the European Economic Area. This dummy is negative 
thus indicating that those from countries outside the European Economic Area are less 
likely to enter the labor market as entrepreneurs than those from the European 
Economic Area. This result still holds if we control for individuals characteristics. 
Controlling for individual characteristics (column (2)), the probability of entry 
through entrepreneurship is, on average, 5.7% for those from within the EEA and 
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Table 4. Regression Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
No EEA -0.838*** -0.641*** -0.363*** -0.693*** -0.441*** -0.253*** 
 




















    
0.095*** 0.107*** 




0.069*** 0.071*** 0.057*** 0.082*** 0.074*** 
  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Schooling 
 
-0.038*** -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.038*** -0.031*** 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Schooling2 
 
0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 
 
0.054*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age2 
 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -1.446*** -3.048*** -3.454*** -3.107*** -4.011*** -4.514*** 
 
(0.029) (0.104) (0.107) (0.104) (0.143) (0.147) 
Log Likelihood -14427.0 -13757.7 -13603.9 -13683.7 -13706.5 -13498.5 
Number of Obs. 159712 159712 159712 159712 159712 159712 
 Significance is indicated as follows  * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.001 (two tailed tests). Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
 
Results concerning individual characteristics are in line with our expectations. 
Men are more likely to enter the labor market as entrepreneurs than women, which is 
consistent with Minniti and Nardone (2007) who find that women are less likely than 
men to be involved in entrepreneurship. Education has a nonlinear effect upon the 
probability of individuals enter the labor market as entrepreneurs. Among low skilled 
individuals (those with at most 4 schooling years) those with more schooling years are 
more likely to enter the labor market as salaried workers rather than entrepreneurs. 
Among those individuals with 5 or more schooling years, the opposite happens. Those 
with higher education are more likely to engage in entrepreneurship upon arrival 
rather than undertake salaried work. This is not surprising, as education can develop 
or increase individuals’ skills and ability to evaluate market opportunities (Robinson 
& Sexton, 1994). Age has an inverted U-shaped effect upon the probability of 
entering the labor market as an entrepreneur. However, this probability reached its 
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maximum at an age of 74 years old. Therefore, we conclude that, during the relevant 
age span, older individuals are more likely than younger ones to enter the labor 
market as entrepreneurs. Older individuals are less likely to be hired in paid 
employment (Daniel & Heywood, 2007), although they may hold greater human 
capital than younger ones. Older individuals may go abroad to engage in 
entrepreneurship as a way to avoid unemployment or to prolong their active life 
beyond retirement (Kibler et al., 2012). 
We discussed earlier that unfamiliarity and discrimination create obstacles to 
the integration of foreigners in the labor market of the host country. These two factors 
influence integration both in paid employment and in entrepreneurship. Thus 
obstacles to entrepreneurship do not arise exclusively from regulations. Differences 
between home and host countries may affect the labor market choice of foreigners 
upon arrival as they may contribute to a higher unfamiliarity with the host country 
and to a greater discrimination experienced by foreigners. We add variables 
accounting for differences between home and host countries to our previous 
specification to see how these differences affect the labor market choice of foreigners 
upon arrival. Results are in columns (3) to (6) of in Table 4. Foreigners whose 
countries of origin are more dissimilar to the host country in cultural and political 
terms are more likely to enter the labor market through entrepreneurship than those 
from countries similar to the host country. This result suggests that differences 
between countries create stronger obstacles to entry into salaried work than into 
entrepreneurship. Both, entry into salaried work and into entrepreneurship, require 
individuals to go through procedures with which they are not completely familiar. 
However, once these procedures are completed engagement in entrepreneurship is 
dependent on individuals’ will, while entry into paid employment is contingent also 
on employers’ will to hire. Employers’ unfamiliarity (or even prejudice) with 
individuals from countries with greater dissimilarity from the host country may bias 
them towards hiring workers from similar countries (OECD, 2006). The skills of 
those from countries dissimilar to the host country may be less transferable than the 
skills of those from similar countries in what paid employment is concerned. 
Therefore, upon arrival differences between countries seem to be particularly relevant 
in the integration of foreigners through paid employment. 
Foreigners from wealthier countries are more likely than those from poor 
countries to enter the labor market as entrepreneurs. Foreigners from high income 
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countries are likely to have more wealth than those from poor countries (Akresh, 
2011). This is of particular importance as foreigners may be discriminated in the 
credit markets of the host country. Individuals from wealthier countries are thus less 
likely to be financially constrained than those from poor countries. Financial 
constraints are found to be a critical factor determining who engages in 
entrepreneurship (Evans & Jovanovic, 1989). Therefore, those form wealthier 
countries are less likely to be excluded from entrepreneurship due to lack of funding. 
Our results are consistent with (Fairlie & Meyer, 1996) who find that groups with 
advantages in terms of capital have higher self-employment rates. Results concerning 
individuals’ characteristics remain qualitatively the same. 
 
5.2 – Change in Immigration Law 
Table 5 displays sample averages for individuals from countries within the 
European Economic Area and those outside this area, before and after the change in 
the law. We can see that, within each group, individuals’ characteristics do no change 
dramatically after the law was changed. Nevertheless, differences are on average 
larger among those from countries outside the European Economic Area. Overall, 
after the law was changed, those coming to Portugal were, on average, younger 
individuals with more education and a higher share of females who come from 
countries politically more dissimilar to Portugal. After the change in the law, those 
from countries outside the European Economic Area came from richer countries 
culturally more similar to Portugal. By contrast, those from countries within the 
European Economic Area came from poorer countries culturally more different from 
Portugal. 
Table 6 reports sample averages for the sample obtained by matching 
individuals from each group, European Economic Area and outside this area, before 
and after the change in the law without imposing that individuals have similar 
characteristics across groups. As expected, differences in characteristics after the 
change in the law are, on average, smaller in this sample. Differences remain in 






Table 5. Sample Averages: Before and after the change in the law 
EEA 
  Before After Difference 
Age 34.974 34.432 -0.542* 
Schooling Years 9.951 10.646 0.695*** 
Male 0.585 0.579 -0.006 
Cultural Distance 71.933 73.755 1.822 
Political Distance 0.817 0.949 0.132*** 
GDPpc 22 719.680 21 958.500 -761.180*** 
Number of Observations 2 862 3 204   
No EEA 
  Before After Difference 
Age 31.757 30.897 -0.860*** 
Schooling Years 6.253 6.864 0.611*** 
Male 0.598 0.567 -0.031*** 
Cultural Distance 19.299 18.316 -0.983*** 
Political Distance 1.249 1.411 0.162*** 
GDPpc 2 961.331 4 565.213 1 603.882*** 
Number of Observations 22 720 35 444   
Significance is indicated as follows  * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.001 (two tailed tests). 
 
Table 6. Sample Averages: matched sample over time 
EEA 
  Before After Difference 
Age 34.482 34.474 -0.008 
Schooling Years 10.273 10.201 -0.072 
Male 0.592 0.596 0.004 
Cultural Distance 71.637 73.977 2.340* 
Political Distance 0.817 0.945 0.128*** 
GDPpc 22 703.680 22 051.050 -652.630*** 
Number of Observations 2 769 2 769   
No EEA 
  Before After Difference 
Age 32.214 32.417 0.203*** 
Schooling Years 6.387 6.442 0.055 
Male 0.601 0.596 -0.005 
Cultural Distance 19.271 18.446 -0.825*** 
Political Distance 1.248 1.434 0.186*** 
GDPpc 2 962.769 4 475.960 1 513.191*** 
Number of Observations 33 639 33 639   




Sample averages for our second matched sample are in Table 7. This sample 
was obtained by matching the characteristics of individuals from the European 
Economic Area and the characteristics of those outside this area before and after the 
change in the law without imposing individuals within each group in 2005/2006 to 
have characteristics similar to individuals within the same group in 2008/2009. As 
expected, the characteristics of individuals in both groups, EEA and No EEA, are 
more similar. Individuals from countries outside the European Economic Area in this 
sample are older, with higher educational levels, with a lower share of males and 
come from wealthier countries that are culturally more dissimilar to Portugal.   
 
Table 7. Sample Averages: matched sample across groups 
Before the New Law 
  EEA No EEA Difference 
Age 34.858 38.978 4.120*** 
Schooling Years 9.926 9.823 -0.103 
Male 0.584 0.540 -0.044*** 
Cultural Distance 71.880 20.671 -51.209*** 
Political Distance 0.818 1.224 0.406*** 
GDPpc 22 715.990 3 550.273 -19 165.717*** 
Number of Observations 2 853 2 853   
After the New Law 
  EEA No EEA Difference 
Age 34.195 39.575 5.380*** 
Schooling Years 10.567 10.265 -0.302*** 
Male 0.576 0.575 -0.001 
Cultural Distance 73.668 20.609 -53.059*** 
Political Distance 0.949 1.438 0.489*** 
GDPpc 21 951.000 8 335.258 -13 615.742*** 
Number of Observations 3 256 3 256   
 Significance is indicated as follows  * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.001 (two tailed tests). 
 
To evaluate the impact of changing the immigration law, we extend our 
previous model to include a dummy variable indicating the period after the change in 
the law (2008/2009) and an interaction of this variable with the dummy indicating that 
individuals come from countries outside the European Economic Area. That is, our 
model allows for a group effect (dummy No EEA), a time effect (variable After the 
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Law) and a time effect specific to those that are subject to the change in the law (No 
EEA×After the Law). If the change in the law did incentive entrepreneurship then we 
would expect the sign of the interaction between “No EEA” and “After the Law” to 
be positive. Table 8 displays the results of estimating this extended model for our 
three samples. We can see in column (1) that the interaction term “No EEA×After the 
Law” is positive and significant, thus suggesting that the change in the law did 
provide incentives for foreigners engage in entrepreneurship upon arrival. 
 
Table 8. Regression Results: Change in the Law 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Unmatched Matched 1 Matched 2 
No EEA -0.742*** -0.244*** -0.718*** 
 
(0.037) (0.039) (0.057) 
After the Law 0.037 0.064 0.055 
 
(0.043) (0.045) (0.044) 
No EEA×After the Law 0.114** 0.066 0.076 
 
(0.048) (0.051) (0.074) 
Male 0.061*** 0.065*** 0.132*** 
 
(0.020) (0.022) (0.037) 
Schooling -0.046*** -0.050*** -0.046*** 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012) 
Schooling2 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Age 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.111*** 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012) 
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -2.693*** -2.613*** -4.114*** 
  (0.121) (0.136) (0.241) 
Log Likelihood -9318.836 -7840.770 -3058.573 
Number of Obs. 87 177 72 816 12 218 
Significance is indicated as follows  * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.001 (two tailed tests). Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
 
In columns (2) and (3) we have results from estimation with matched samples. 
Results in both matched samples reveal that the impact of changing the law on the 
probability of foreigners engaging in entrepreneurship upon arrival is not statistically 
significant, although it remains positive. This suggests that changing the law may be 
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also changing the characteristics of foreigners coming to Portugal, which may in turn 
be increasing the likelihood of entrepreneurship upon arrival. 
Table 9 presents the results of estimating the probability of individuals that 
enter the Portuguese labor market in 2005/2006 and in 2008/2009, choose to do so as 
entrepreneurs. Estimation is done using the three samples considered in Table 8. We 
can see that foreigners from within the European Economic Area are always more 
likely to engage in entrepreneurship upon arrival than those from outside this area. 
These differences are statistically significant in all cases, as t statistics in rows are all 
between 12.296 and 13.049. 
Foreigners are more likely to enter as entrepreneurs in 2008/2009 than in 
2005/2006. However, for individuals from countries outside the European Economic 
Area probabilities before and after the new law are statistically different with all 
samples, while for those from countries within this area probabilities before and after 
the new law are never statistically different. 
To evaluate if the change in the law had a significant impact upon the 
probability of foreigners enter the labor market as entrepreneurs, we compare the 
variation in the probabilities of both groups by taking the difference of the differences 
ΔP across groups (column (5)). If changing the law was to increase the probability of 
entrepreneurship upon arrival figures in column (5) should be positive, as the change 
did not affect those from within the area. However, DID in column (5) are positive 
with the unmatched sample but negative with both matched samples, and never 
statistically significant. We thus conclude that changing the law seemed to increase 
the likelihood of entrepreneurship upon arrival but not in a significant way. We saw 
earlier that the share of foreigners engaged in entrepreneurship upon arrival began to 
increase in 2005 before the new law was in force. Thus, the increase in the likelihood 
of entrepreneurship upon arrival can also be a consequence of a change in the pattern 









Table 9. Predicted Probabilities: Before and after the change in law 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
 
t0: t1:  ΔP=Pr(t1)–Pr(t0) 
DID 
t Stat. DID 
2005/2006 2008/2009  ΔPNoEEA–ΔPEEA 
Unmatched Sample 
 t Stat. 	   	   	  EEA 7.62% 8.14% 0.860 0.005 
	   	  No EEA 1.61% 2.29% 6.946 0.007 0.0016 0.2646 
t Stat. 13.049 12.843   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Matched Sample 1 
 t Stat. 	   	   	  EEA 7.63% 8.56% 1.407 0.009 
	   	  No EEA 1.67% 2.27% 5.505 0.006 -0.0033 0.4899 
t Stat. 12.440 12.296   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Matched Sample 2 
 t Stat. 	   	   	  EEA 12.61% 13.68% 1.233 0.012 
	   	  No EEA 3.52% 4.57% 2.236 0.003 -0.0002 0.0141 
t Stat. 12.769 12.855   	  	   	  	   	  	  
 
 
5.3 – Robustness: change in immigration law 
We performed a robustness check to estimations in Table 9. In 2006 the 
information that the immigration law was going to change could already be public and 
thus individuals could be already adjusting their choices. In 2008, individuals could 
still be adjusting their choices in response to the change in the law enforced in 2007. 
Therefore, in our robustness check we repeated estimation in Table 9 in a sample 
restricted to those entering the labor market in 2005 and in 2009, rather than in 
2005/2006 and 2008/2009. We also repeated the matching process described earlier in 
a sample restricted to those entering the labor market in 2005 and in 2009, rather than 
in 2005/2006 and 2008/2009. Results of this robustness check are in Table 10, and 
remained qualitatively the same as those in Table 8: changing the law may have 








Table 10. Robustness: Change in the law  - 2005 vs 2009 
  (1) (3) (5) 
 Unmatched Matched 1 Matched 2 
No EEA -0.623*** -0.574*** -0.433*** 
 
(0.057) (0.061) (0.088) 
After the Law 0.096 0.148** 0.127* 
 
(0.064) (0.067) (0.066) 
No EEA×After the Law 0.139* 0.043 0.038 
 
(0.075) (0.079) (0.119) 
Male 0.057* 0.072** 0.160*** 
 
(0.033) (0.035) (0.058) 
Schooling -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.004 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.019) 
Schooling2 0.884*** 0.004*** 0.002* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age 0.071*** 0.075*** 0.133*** 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.019) 
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -3.382*** -3.459*** -4.906*** 
  (0.212) (0.230) (0.400) 
Log Likelihood -3303.099 -2971.267 -1281.645 
Number of Obs. 28541 25208 4835 
Significance is indicated as follows  * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.001 (two tailed tests). Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We study foreigners’ choice between salaried work and entrepreneurship upon 
arrival to the host country. We study how this choice is affected by individuals’ 
characteristics, differences between home and host countries, and host country 
regulations on entry into entrepreneurship. We find that individuals’ country of origin 
affects their choice concerning entry into entrepreneurship upon arrival. Foreigners 
whose countries of origin are more dissimilar of the host country are more likely to 
enter the labor market as entrepreneurs than those from similar countries, after 
controlling for individual characteristics. Differences between countries may decrease 
the transferability of individuals’ skills and qualifications to the labor market of the 
host country. This is particularly critical in salaried work as employers may not be 
able to properly assess candidates from dissimilar countries and prefer to hire those 
perceived as more similar to local workers. According to our findings, foreigners 
from wealthier countries are more likely than those from poor countries to enter the 
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labor market as entrepreneurs. This finding suggests that financial constraints may be 
less binding for those from wealthier countries and thus they are less likely to be 
excluded from entrepreneurship due to lack of funding. 
Individuals from countries outside the European Economic Area wishing to 
engage in entrepreneurship have to fulfill requirements imposed by the Portuguese 
immigration law that are not required to those from countries within this area, because 
Portugal is a member of the European Economic Area. Foreigners whose countries of 
origin are outside the European Economic Area are less likely to enter the labor 
market as entrepreneurs than those form countries within this area, even after 
controlling for individual characteristics and differences between home and host 
countries. Reducing legal restrictions on entrepreneurship imposed to foreigners from 
outside the European Economic Area may encourage them to choose 
entrepreneurship. However, according to our results, the impact of this reduction upon 
entrepreneurship is not significant. The share of foreign entrepreneurs began to 
increase around 2005 that is before the new law was in force. Thus, the increase in the 
likelihood of entrepreneurship upon arrival can result from a change in the pattern of 
immigrants coming to Portugal.  
The integration of immigrants in the labor market of the host country is crucial 
to promote their integration in the society of that country. Entrepreneurship may be an 
alternative way for foreigners’ integration in the labor market of the host country, as 
salaried work may not allow them to fully exploit their skills. Several countries have 
implemented policies to attract foreigners to engage in entrepreneurship (OECD, 
2010). According to our results, policies that help foreigners learn about the host 
country and that allow foreigners to get acquainted with locals and locals with them 
may improve the prospects of foreign entrepreneurs and thus their integration in the 
labor market of the host country. Likewise, policies that help foreigners get access to 
funding are of particular importance to promote entrepreneurship among them. For 
example, (Ramsden, 2008) finds that, in the UK, providing capital and loan 
guarantees to foreigners contributes to the success of their entrepreneurial ventures. 
Therefore, our results suggest that providing foreigners the means to engage in 
entrepreneurship or helping them to obtain such means can be more effective in 
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Table 11. Entries in the Labor Market by Country of Origin 
  Entrepreneurs Workers % Entrepreneurs 
Brazil 1008 59816 1.66% 
Ukraine 111 34003 0.33% 
Romania 87 13180 0.66% 
Cape Verde 100 11704 0.85% 
Moldova 70 8914 0.78% 
Angola 76 8628 0.87% 
Guinea-Bissau 80 7508 1.05% 
Other European Countries 165 5377 2.98% 
China 340 4385 7.20% 
Russia 76 3074 2.41% 
India 43 3041 1.39% 
Spain 228 2519 8.30% 
São Tomé and Príncipe 10 2491 0.40% 
France 156 1816 7.91% 
United Kingdom 368 1559 19.10% 
Germany 185 1569 10.55% 
Other Asian Countries 26 1189 2.14% 
Pakistan 34 1070 3.08% 
Other African Countries 27 1024 2.57% 
Mozambique 17 894 1.87% 
Morocco 14 727 1.89% 
Italy 80 617 11.48% 
Poland 6 659 0.90% 
Venezuela 27 621 4.17% 
Senegal 4 621 0.64% 
Bangladesh 21 562 3.60% 
Netherlands 123 435 22.04% 
Other South American Countries 23 494 4.45% 
Guinea 1 467 0.21% 
Lithuania 0 367 0.00% 
Cuba 13 275 4.51% 
Belgium 33 244 11.91% 
USA 21 253 7.66% 
Sweden 8 186 4.12% 
Austria 15 162 8.47% 
Canada 19 143 11.73% 
Ireland 42 118 26.25% 
Switzerland 22 127 14.77% 
Czech Republic 3 132 2.22% 
Servia 3 126 2.33% 




Philippines 1 113 0.88% 
Hungary 3 90 3.23% 
Slovakia 0 86 0.00% 
Latvia 4 79 4.82% 
Japan 4 64 5.88% 
Denmark 13 54 19.40% 
Turkey 7 60 10.45% 
Finland 4 56 6.67% 
Mexico 2 48 4.00% 
Greece 8 41 16.33% 
Estonia 4 45 8.16% 
Other Oceania Countries 5 44 10.20% 
Luxembourg 2 37 5.13% 
Slovenia 0 35 0.00% 
Norway 5 27 15.63% 
East Timor 0 18 0.00% 
Iceland 0 10 0.00% 
Malta 0 9 0.00% 
Cyprus 1 2 33.33% 
Liechtenstein 0 2 0.00% 
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Transitions to entrepreneurship: the impact of countries of 




We compare foreign and native individuals in their transition from wage 
employment to entrepreneurship. We find that foreign individuals are less likely than 
natives to switch to entrepreneurship, even after controlling for individuals’ 
characteristics and industries. The opportunity cost of leaving wage employment is 
stronger for foreigners than it is for natives. Individuals from countries that are more 
dissimilar from the host country have higher probabilities of switching from wage 
employment to entrepreneurship. Individuals from less developed countries are more 
likely to switch to entrepreneurship the wealthier their country of origin is, while for 


















The number of foreign individuals engaged in entrepreneurial activities has 
been increasing around the world. The average share of foreign-born individuals in 
the population of 21 countries in the OECD increased from 13.1% to 15.2%, between 
2001 and 2008 (OECD Migration Databases). In the same period, the share foreign-
born individuals who were self-employed rose from 11.3% to 12.6%, while the share 
of self-employed natives rose from 11.6% to 12%. 
Several countries have implemented policies to support foreign entrepreneurs 
already in the host country and also to attract new ones (OECD, 2010). Foreign 
individuals may be a source of diverse entrepreneurial skills, thus contributing to job 
creation and economic growth (Van Praag & Versloot, 2007; Wildeman et al., 1990).  
Between 1998 and 2008, foreign entrepreneurs' contribution to employment was 
equivalent to 1.5 – 3% of the total labor force employed in OECD countries (OECD, 
2011). Thus, it is important to understand the entrepreneurial behavior of foreigners in 
order to improve integration policies, which in turn may help economic growth and 
job creation in the host country. 
Most studies on entrepreneurship by immigrants focus on self-employment 
(Clark & Drinkwater, 1998; Clark & Drinkwater, 2000; Fairlie & Meyer, 1996; 
Borjas, 1986; Yuengert, 1995; Nee et al., 1994). Self-employment is often considered 
a strategy to avoid labor market exclusion or discrimination (Clark & Drinkwater, 
1998). Discrimination against immigrants in the labor market may result in a wage 
gap relative to natives (Reimers, 1983). These hurdles in paid employment reduce the 
opportunity cost of self-employment thus increasing its attractiveness relative to wage 
employment (Clark & Drinkwater, 1998; Hammarstedt, 2006). Therefore, self-
employment rates are often found to be higher among immigrants that among natives 
(Yuengert, 1995; Li, 2001, Clark & Drinkwater, 1998, OECD, 2010). 
Immigrants’ entrepreneurial activities may go beyond the traditional ethnic 
businesses. Recent studies find that immigrants account for an important share of high 
skilled workers and high tech entrepreneurs  (Wadhwa et al., 2007; Saxenian, 2002; 
Kerr, 2013; Stephan & Levin, 2001). Therefore, the perspective that immigrants resort 
to self-employment as a response to obstacles in paid employment ignores that they 
may use entrepreneurship to exploit comparative advantages (Clark & Drinkwater, 
2000). 
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Another common finding is that self-employment rates and earnings vary 
considerably among immigrants (Borjas & Bonars, 1989; Borjas, 1987; Borjas, 1986; 
Yuengert, 1995; Fairlie & Meyer, 1996). Social norms and attitudes within societies 
as well as economic constraints shape individuals' decisions.  Thus, countries of 
origin may affect the entrepreneurial behavior of foreigners in the host country. Most 
studies consider one or few nationalities often related with specific ethnic groups that 
are at a disadvantaged position in the host country. Small sets of specific nationalities 
do not allow us to confirm if the uncovered patterns hold for a broader set of 
nationalities, that is, for foreigners in general. 
In this study, we are interested in those individuals who already have a job as 
paid workers and decide to start a firm employing paid labor. The self-employed or 
those firms that employ only the entrepreneur and unpaid family workers are thus 
excluded from our analysis. We study how countries of origin and experience in the 
host country determine the entrepreneurial behavior of foreign individuals. We 
compare foreign and native individuals concerning their probability of leaving wage 
employment to engage in entrepreneurship. We use data on individuals who are paid 
workers in Portugal in each year between 2002 and 2009 and see if they switch to 
entrepreneurship in the following period. We have data on foreign individuals from 
over 60 nationalities, which allows us to study the effect of country of origin. We find 
that foreign individuals have lower probabilities of switching to entrepreneurship 
when compared to natives and these probabilities depend of their country of origin 
and of the magnitude of their experience in the host country. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we characterize immigrants in 
the Portuguese labor market. Section 3 reviews previous research. In section 4 we 
discuss the framework in which we conduct our analysis. Section 5 presents the 
empirical model and the data that we will use in the empirical estimation. In Section 6 
we discuss our results. Lastly, we provide concluding remarks in Section 7. 
 
2. Immigrants in the Portuguese Labor Market 
Immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon in Portugal. According to the 
Population Censuses the share of foreign individuals increased from 1% in 1992 to 
4% in the period 2002-2009. In the last decade the increase in the number of 
immigrants had origin in countries that were not traditional sources of immigration 
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before. The share of foreigners from Portuguese speaking African countries decreased 
from 56% in 2001 to 25% in 2011. In contrast, Brazilian individuals increased their 
share from 14% in 2001 to 29% in 2011. The share of Ukrainian individuals among 
foreigners, which was negligible in 2001, increased to 11% in 2011. In the same 
period, individuals from European Union countries represent more that 20% of the 
total number of foreigners. 
Employment rates among immigrants in Portugal are usually high as a result 
of immigration flows that are substantially driven by work opportunities. In 
2005/2006 the average employment rate of immigrants was 75.4%, which is higher 
than the 73.6% of natives. Immigrants in Portugal work in a small number of sectors, 
in particular construction (26%) and hotels and restaurants (15%), and they are mostly 
in low-skilled occupations. In fact, a considerable share of immigrants is 
overqualified for the jobs they hold. In 2005/2006 36.6% of highly qualified 
immigrants were in low-medium skilled jobs, while for natives this figure was 21.1%. 
Perhaps, as a consequence immigrants earn less than Portuguese workers. This wage 
gap was around 20% in 2005(OECD, 2008). Another relevant difference between 
immigrants concerns their employment stability. Only 55.6% of immigrants hold 
permanent contracts, while 81.2% of natives do so. 
The contribution of foreign individuals to entrepreneurship has increased in 
Portugal. The average number of foreign entrepreneurs increased from 4000 in 1998-
2000 to 7000 in 2007-2008, while for natives these figures were 74000 and 42000 
respectively. The share of individuals in the labor force who were not self-employed 
in the previous year and became self-employed in 1998-2000 was 1.19% for 
foreigners and 1.13% for natives; in 2007-2008 this share increased to 1.14% for 
foreigners while for natives it decreased to 0.65%. Firms owned by foreign and native 
entrepreneurs are mainly small. Around 30-33% of firms have 2 to 10 employees, 5-
6% have between 11 and 49 employees and only 1% has 50 or more employees. The 
average number of jobs created in firms with less than 50 employees is around 1.6 to 
2.5 both in firms owned by foreigners and natives. Employees in firms owned by 
foreign entrepreneurs represent 4.7% of employment in the firms of all entrepreneurs 
in 1998-2000 while in 2007-2008 this number increased to 5.7% (OECD, 2011). 
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3. Previous Research 
The entrepreneurial behavior of foreign individuals has been studied with a 
focus on self-employment. Self-employment appears as a response to lack of 
alternatives or obstacles in paid employment, such as discrimination (Bisin et al., 
2011). These obstacles may result in an earnings gap between immigrants and natives, 
in particular in paid employment (Chiswick, 1978; Friedberg, 2000). As a 
consequence, discrimination may push immigrants into self-employment to a larger 
extent than those who are not discriminated against (Constant & Zimmermann, 2006). 
Consistent with this argument, Hammarstedt (2006) finds that, in Sweden, an increase 
in the differential between the earnings in self-employment and paid employment, 
increases the self-employment rate among immigrants. Likewise, Lofstrom (2002) 
finds that self-employed immigrants fare better in the labor market than immigrants in 
paid employment. In fact, self-employment is often pointed out as an alternative for 
immigrants to achieve economic success (Portes & Zhou, 1996). 
Immigrants may have comparative advantages in serving specific markets, 
such as those related with their countries of origin (Zhou, 2004; Drori et al., 2009). 
This may pull immigrant to engage in entrepreneurial ventures to exploit these 
advantages. Immigrants may take advantage of ethnic enclaves (geographical 
concentration of individuals of the same origin) and serve their own ethnic 
communities in the host market. Borjas (1986) finds that, in the US, the self-
employment rates of immigrants exceed those of natives and part of this differential 
can be explained by an enclave effect. He finds that Hispanics are more likely to be 
self-employed in areas with larger Hispanic populations and this effect is larger for 
Hispanics than for natives. Likewise, Evans (1989) and Le (2000) find that enclaves 
can explain the higher self-employment rates among particular groups of immigrants 
in Australia. Immigrants may also provide natives with products coming from their 
countries of origin, acting like middleman minorities (Bonacich, 1973). 
Most immigrants are often found to have self-employment rates higher than 
the ones of natives. Nevertheless, self-employment rates of immigrants vary 
considerable between groups (Borjas, 1986; Yuengert, 1995; Clark & Drinkwater, 
1998; OECD, 2010). For example, Fairlie (1999) finds that African American men are 
less likely than natives to be self-employed. These differences may occur even among 
groups of similar origins. Fernandez & Kim (1998) find that Koreans have the highest 
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self-employment rates among Koreans, Chinese, Asian Indians and Vietnamese. 
Moreover, while there are proportionally more Korean college-graduates engaged in 
self-employment, among other Asian groups college graduates show the lowest self-
employment rates. 
Individuals’ characteristics may explain some differences within and between 
groups (Hammarstedt, 2004). However, substantial differences persist, even after 
controlling for some characteristics. Peoples’ attitudes and behaviors may also 
determine their entrepreneurial behavior. Attitudes and behaviors are to a great extent 
shaped by national culture. Hofstede’s culture dimensions (Hofstede, 2001) have been 
extensively used in the literature to characterize countries cultural profiles (see 
(Kirkman et al., 2006) for a review). Some works have addressed the influence of 
culture in phenomena related to entrepreneurship, such as inventions (Shane, 1992) or 
innovation (Shane, 1993). However, to our knowledge, few works study a direct 
relationship between culture and entrepreneurship and findings are not consensual. In 
a study across nine countries, Mueller & Thomas (2001) found that individualistic 
cultures with low uncertainty avoidance are more conductive to entrepreneurship. In 
Norway, Vinogradov & Kolvereid (2007) found that individuals from countries with 
low power distance are more likely to become self-employed. In a broader study 
comprising 23 OECD countries, Wildeman et al. (1990) found that countries with 
high power distance and high uncertainty avoidance have more self-employed 
individuals. 
 
4. Entrepreneurship among foreign individuals 
We are interested in the entrepreneurial behavior of foreign individuals who 
already hold a job in the host country. Our focus is on foreigners that choose to 
engage in entrepreneurship rather than in those that resort to entrepreneurship because 
they do not have other labor market alternatives. Our aim is to compare the 
entrepreneurial behavior of foreign individuals with that of natives and see how 
countries of origin and experience in the host country influence the entrepreneurial 
behavior of foreigners. In particular, we want to see how differences between home 
and host countries affect individuals' engagement in entrepreneurship. 
Foreignness and differences between home and host countries can be sources 
of obstacles for foreign individuals in the host country. These types of obstacles were 
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emphasized in international business literature under the name of liabilities of 
foreignness. These liabilities arise from unfamiliarity with the local environment, lack 
of legitimacy, constraints imposed by host countries, and cost associated with distance 
(Zaheer, 1995). As a consequence, foreign firms operating abroad were found to 
perform worse than their domestic counterparts (Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer & 
Mosakowski, 1997). International business literature looks to multinational 
corporations. However, as knowledge exists only in individuals (Grant, 1996), we 
believe that there are liabilities of foreignness also at the individual level. Mezias 
(2002) found that, while foreign firms in the US face more labor lawsuits than 
domestic firms, they could reduce the number of such lawsuits by using American top 
officers. This suggests that the liabilities of foreignness experienced by firms can, to 
some extent, arise from individuals. 
The knowledge and experience individuals acquired outside the host country 
may not be entirely appropriate there and thus foreigners are likely to feel some 
degree of unfamiliarity with the host country. Consequently, foreigners that seek to 
engage in entrepreneurship may lack the knowledge necessary to adequate their 
products to the preferences of natives. Thus, their entrepreneurial opportunities may 
be hindered, as consumers will not buy products that are not adequate to their 
preferences (Balabanis et al., 2001; Kaynak & Kara, 2002). 
Discrimination against foreigners in the host country is not an uncommon 
phenomenon (Mayda, 2006). As we discussed earlier, foreigners may have a wage 
gap relative to natives (Chiswick, 1978; Reimers, 1983) and they may be 
discriminated even within firms. Harvey et al. (2005) suggests that foreign employees 
of multinational corporations who work in the corporation’s home country can be 
stigmatized and stereotyped by native employees. Mezias & Mezias (2007) provide 
evidence that, in one firm with headquarters in the US, salary increases of foreigners 
are lower than those of natives in the same firm. Discrimination can also occur when 
foreigners engage in entrepreneurship. Foreigners may be discriminated against by 
local consumers (Nardinelli & Simon, 1990) who perceive products supplied by 
foreigners as worse than those provided by natives (Watson & Wright, 2000). 
Likewise, foreign entrepreneurs may be discriminated against in capital markets (Bell 
et al., 2012) as investors are often biased towards local firms (French & Poterba, 
1991). This bias may prevent foreigners from obtaining capital in the host country, 
thus aggravating their liquidity constraints. 
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The liabilities of foreign individuals are accentuated by differences between 
home and host countries. These differences may increase the difficulty of foreigners 
to understand and adapt to the local environment (Orr & Scott, 2008) and the 
difficulty of locals understand foreigners. Thus, foreigners from dissimilar countries 
are more unfamiliar with the local environment than those from similar countries. 
These individuals are also more likely to be perceived by natives as less legitimate 
and thus more susceptible to experience discriminatory treatments. As foreigners 
learn how to comply with the host environment and assimilate in the host country 
their disadvantages relative to natives are often reduced. For example, Chiswick 
(1978) found that after 10 to 15 years the earnings of foreign born men equal or even 
exceed those of native born men in the United States. 
Much attention has been given to the negative aspects of foreignness and 
differences between home and host countries. However, foreignness and differences 
between home and host countries are not necessarily a handicap as they may provide 
advantages and benefits. Exposure to multicultural experiences may increase 
creativity (Leung et al., 2008) and thus foreign individuals can be a source of creative 
ideas and innovations that are outside the usual parameters of the host country’s 
society (Shi & Hoskisson, 2012). Foreigners can be able differentiate themselves from 
locals and thus reduce competition (Deephouse, 1999). As discussed earlier, 
foreigners have advantages over natives in serving markets related with communities 
of the same or similar nationalities residing in the host country. The more different 
these communities are from native population the greater these advantages, as local 
entrepreneurs may not be familiar enough with the preferences of consumers from 
these communities. Foreigners’ lack of embeddedness in the host country can also 
work in their favor. Foreigners are detached from prevailing norms and attitudes 
within the host country. Thus they are able to identify and exploit opportunities 
missed by natives, by deviating from standard practices adopted in the host country. 
For example, Siegel et al. (2011) find that American firms are able to take advantage 
of discrimination against women in South Korea by hiring a higher share of female 
managers compared to local firms. This would be unlikely if both countries had 
similar practices, as American firms would see discrimination against women as 
standard procedure. 
Empirical studies on the impact of foreignness upon entrepreneurship are 
focused on self-employment and provide mixed evidence. For example, while Borjas 
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(1986) finds that the self-employment rates of several immigrant groups exceed those 
of their native-born counterpart, Borjas & Bonars (1989) find that self-employment 
rates are lower for foreign groups than for natives, even after controlling for 
individuals’ characteristics. The impact of differences between the attitudes and 
behaviors of foreigners and natives upon their entrepreneurial behavior is also left 
undone. The interplay between home and host countries may affect individuals’ 
entrepreneurial behavior, as attitudes and behaviors are greatly shaped by national 
culture. 
 
5. Data and Estimation 
5.1 – Empirical Model 
We follow a comparative advantage framework to study what makes an 
individual leave paid employment to become an entrepreneur (Rees & Shah, 1986;  
Constant & Zimmermann, 2006; Carrasco, 1999). Individuals choose between paid 
employment and entrepreneurship by comparing the gains (pecuniary or non-
pecuniary) they expect to obtain in each case (Borjas, 1986). Individuals switch to 
entrepreneurship if the expected gains of this option exceed those of paid 
employment.  
We do not observe individuals’ expected gains, only if an individual switches 
to entrepreneurship, at a given period. Let 𝑤!   and 𝑒! denote individual i expected 
wage and expected gains from entrepreneurship, respectively. We define 
𝐸!∗ = 𝑒! − 𝑤! = 𝛽𝑋! + 𝛾𝐷! + 𝑣!                       𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 𝐼 (1) 
 where 𝑋! is a vector of observable individual characteristics,  𝐷! contains variables 
characterizing differences between individuals’ home and host countries and 𝑣! is an 
error term. The probability that a paid worker in period t-1 becomes an entrepreneur 
in period t if given by 
Pr  (E!,!∗ ≥ 0 X!,!!!,D! = F βX!,!!! + γD!       (2)  
where F is specified as the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
We use a probit model to estimate the probability of transition to 
entrepreneurship. We consider individuals’ characteristics in the period before they 
switch (or not) to entrepreneurship in order to avoid confusing causes and 
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consequences of transition to entrepreneurship. Individual characteristics such as 
education, age or gender are expected to affect wages and earnings of 
entrepreneurship. Older males with higher education levels are likely to have higher 
wages but also better prospects regarding entrepreneurial earnings. The net effect of 
such characteristics upon the probability of transition to entrepreneurship will depend 
on whether they affect more entrepreneurial earnings or wages. Differences between 
home and host countries determine, on the one hand, the extent of the unfamiliarity 
and lack of legitimacy experienced by foreigners and, on the other hand, the relative 
advantage they may have over natives. Unfamiliarity and lack of legitimacy harm 
both the wages and entrepreneurial earnings of foreigners, while the relative 
advantage they may have over natives improves their prospects regarding wages and 
entrepreneurial earnings. Overall the impact of differences between home and host 
countries upon the probability of transition to entrepreneurship will depend on which 
effect dominates in the case of wages and in the case of entrepreneurial earnings. 
 
5.2 – Research Sample 
Our analysis is based on the whole population of individuals who were paid 
workers in Portugal from 2002 to 2009. The source of our data is Quadros de Pessoal, 
a dataset that is obtained from a mandatory annual survey conducted by the 
Portuguese Ministry of Employment and covers all firms employing paid labor in 
Portugal. The dataset includes information on all the individuals working at each firm 
including their occupational status, distinguishing between employees and employers 
(business owners), and their nationality. Its longitudinal nature, with individual 
identified by a unique number, allows us to follow them over time and also avoid 
stock sample biases. Although data are available from 1985 to 2009, we start in 2002 
because information about nationalities is available only from this year onwards. 
Overall, we track over 4.4 million individuals of the whole population working in 
firms that employ paid labor during the period 2002-2009. Over 26.000 individuals 





5.3 – Variables 
Our dependent variable is a binary variable taking the value 1 if an individual 
that was a worker switches to entrepreneurship and 0 otherwise. 
We consider the following individual characteristics determining their choice 
between paid employment and entrepreneurship: experience in the host country labor 
market, tenure in the firm, prior experience in entrepreneurship, hourly wages, 
education, gender, and age. Experience in the host country is measured by the number 
of years that an individual has been in the host country labor market. Because we 
have data available starting in 1985 we were able to identify participation in the labor 
market from that year onwards. In addition, we can account for the experience of a 
person who is in the files in 1985 but started working in that firm earlier, as our data 
has information about the date at which each person started working in a firm. Tenure 
in the firm is measured by the number of years that an individual was at that firm. 
Prior experience in entrepreneurship is accounted for with a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if an individual was previously an entrepreneur since he entered our dataset 
and zero otherwise. We include hourly wages earned in the period before individuals 
switch or not to entrepreneurship, because they provide a good benchmark to the 
future wages they will earn if they remain in paid employment. Hourly wages are 
measured by total work compensations in 2009 euros divided the number of hours 
worked. Education is measured by the number of schooling years of each individual. 
Gender is indicated by a dummy variable taking the value 1 for male individuals and 
0 otherwise. A variable with the age of individuals is available in our dataset. We 
include in our model industry dummies concerning the sector in which individuals 
were as paid workers before switching (or not) to entrepreneurship, in order to control 
for possible sector-specific effects in the probability of entrepreneurship (Bates, 
1995). Year dummies are also included to control for the macroeconomic 
environment.  
To account for differences between home and host countries we use national 
culture, political institutions and the level of economic development. Cultural distance 
is measured using four cultural dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism, and masculinity (Hofstede, 2001). These dimensions are aggregated 









where 𝐼!" is the distance score for the ith dimension and jth country, 𝑉! is the variance 
of the score of ith dimension, P stands for Portugal and 𝐶𝐷! is the national distance 
between the jth country and Portugal. 
Political distance is accounted for with a measure developed by (Berry et al., 
2010), which combines five indicator variables: policy-making uncertainty 
(institutional actors with veto power), the size of the state (as a percentage of GDP), a 
democracy score, whether or not countries are WTO members, and if they belong to 
the same trading block. Political uncertainty is often associated with countries where 
governments have low levels of democracy, few institutional constraints, high levels 
of state ownership, and that often lack credibility (Murtha & Lenway, 1994; Henisz, 
2000). In countries that have high levels of political uncertainty policies may change 
almost arbitrarily. Thus, it is more difficult for foreigners to adapt in countries with 
high political uncertainty because it is more difficult for them to foresee such 
changes. Close political ties between countries may support the exchange of 
information through commercial relationships. Thus, foreigners from countries with 
commercial relations with the host country may be more familiar with the host 
country than those from countries without such relations (Brewer, 2007). 
 Economic development is measured by GDP per capita in constant prices of 
2000 adjusted for purchasing power parity. Data were collected from the United 
Nations World Development Indicators Database.  
 
6. Results 
6.1 – Differences between foreign and native individuals  
Table 12 reports sample averages of foreign and native individuals. The age 
and education of foreigners are similar to those of natives but foreigners have a higher 
share of male individuals. Foreigners and natives have different levels of experience 
in the host country, as one would expect. Both labor market experience and 
entrepreneurial experience of foreigners in Portugal is considerably lower than those 
of natives. Native individuals have an experience of around 13 years in the labor 
market while foreigners have only approximately 3 years. Among natives, 2% of 
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individuals have been previously engaged in entrepreneurship while for foreigners 
this figure is below 0.5%. Foreigners also reveal lower tenure and slightly lower 
wages when compared to natives. These differences result, to some extent, of the fact 
that foreigners are in the local labor market for a shorter length of time. Compared to 
those remaining paid workers, individuals switching to entrepreneurship have lower 
labor market experience in the host country and lower tenure, and higher shares of 
them are younger males who were previously engaged in entrepreneurship. 
 
Table 12. Sample Averages: Unmatched Sample 
Unmatched Sample 
All Sample Native Foreign Difference = N - F 
Host Country Experience 13.297 3.157 10.140*** 
Previously Entrepreneur 0.021 0.003 0.018*** 
Tenure in Firm 8.795 2.977 5.818*** 
Hourly Wage 6.443 5.323 1.120*** 
Male 0.572 0.658 -0.086*** 
Schooling Years 8.276 6.997 1.279*** 
Age 37.621 35.143 2.478*** 
Number of Individuals 2 921 984 103 493   
Number of observations 11 331 680 249 880  
Switch to Entrepreneurship Native Foreign Difference = N - F 
Host Country Experience 10.668 2.805 7.863*** 
Previously Entrepreneur 0.108 0.033 0.075*** 
Tenure in Firm 5.518 2.300 3.218*** 
Hourly Wage 7.341 4.351 2.99*** 
Male 0.676 0.736 -0.060*** 
Schooling Years 9.657 6.354 3.303*** 
Age 34.668 34.150 0.518 
Number of Individuals 25517 603   
Number of observations 25 617 605   
 
Figure 2 displays the number of individuals by country of origin and the rates 
at which they switch to entrepreneurship. We only display the 33 groups with positive 
switching rates and thus Figure 2 does not display all nationalities in our sample as 
some of them have switching rates equal to zero. Switching rates vary across 
countries with individuals from some countries revealing rates above the ones of 
natives and others below. No obvious pattern emerges from Figure 2. The group of 
countries with the highest switching rates comprises countries like China, 
Switzerland, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the United Kingdom. Worth noticing is that 
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Portuguese speaking countries account for a considerable number of workers in our 
sample but are among those with the lowest switching rates. 
 
 
Figure 2. Individuals By Country of Origin 
 
In order to select natives that are similar to the foreigners in our sample, we 
match natives and foreigners that have comparable characteristics in each year. To do 
this matching we estimated a propensity score indicating the probability of an 
individual being foreign using the whole sample of foreigners and natives in each one 
of the years 2002 to 2008. These probabilities were estimated using as covariates 
individuals’ host country experience, a dummy variable indicating if the individual 
was previously engaged in entrepreneurship in the host country, tenure in the firm, 
hourly wages, gender, schooling, age and sectors. For each foreigner we selected the 
native with the probability that is closest to the one of the foreigner, ensuring that the 
distance between these probabilities does not exceed a small value (0.01). A total of 
13.623 foreigners (3% of all foreigners in our sample) were excluded because we did 
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sample has the same number of observations for foreigners and natives in each year, 
which correspond to a total of 101.638 foreigners and 202.985 natives. The number of 
natives in our sample is larger than the number of foreigners and thus when searching 
for natives with characteristics similar to the ones of foreigners we find several 
candidates for the matching. That is, for a particular foreign, his native match in one 
year does not have to be the same native match in a different year, as we have a 
considerable pool of natives to do the matching. As a result, native individuals are 
less repeated in the sample than foreigners and thus have a greater number of 
observations than the later. 
Table 13 report descriptive statistics for the unmatched and matched samples 
respectively. We can see that native and foreign individuals in the matched sample are 
indeed more similar to each other. 
 
Table 13. Sample Averages: Matched Sample 
Matched Sample 
All Sample Native Foreign Difference = N - F 
Host Country Experience 3.326 3.224 0.102*** 
Previously Entrepreneur 0.003 0.003 0.000*** 
Tenure in Firm 3.045 3.019 0.0260*** 
Hourly Wage 4.897 5.344 -0.447*** 
Male 0.636 0.656 -0.02*** 
Schooling Years 7.341 7.195 0.146*** 
Age 35.159 35.082 0.077*** 
Number of Individuals 198 250 100 269   
Number of observations 265 767 242 736  
Switch to Entrepreneurship Native Foreign Difference = N - F 
Host Country Experience 2.667 2.894 -0.227 
Previously Entrepreneur 0.025 0.035 -0.010 
Tenure in Firm 2.514 2.343 0.171* 
Hourly Wage 5.018 4.375 0.643*** 
Male 0.716 0.727 -0.011 
Schooling Years 8.244 6.671 1.573*** 
Age 33.935 33.970 -0.035 
Number of Individuals 851 573   
Number of observations 851 575   
 
Table 14 shows the education levels of individuals switching to 
entrepreneurship. We can see that, among those switching to entrepreneurship, 
foreigners have education levels lower than those of natives. The share of foreigners 
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with schooling between zero and four years is higher than the corresponding share for 
natives, while for the remaining schooling classes the opposite happens. 
 
Table 14. Education Levels of Individuals Switching to Entrepreneurship 
  Foreign % Native % 
[0,4] 252 0.440 210 0.247 
[5,9] 184 0.321 371 0.437 
[10,12] 106 0.185 186 0.219 
[13, …] 31 0.054 82 0.097 
 
Table 15 displays the distribution of transitions into entrepreneurship by 
sectors. Transitions into entrepreneurship occur mainly in wholesale and retail trade, 
accommodation, professional, scientific and technical activities, real estate activities 
and restaurants. Within the top exit sectors, foreigners account for higher shares vis-a-
vis natives mainly in retail trade and real estate, while within the top entry sectors, the 
same happens in accommodation, real estate activities and restaurants. 
 
Table 15. Exit and Entry Sectors 
Panel a. Exit Foreign Natives 
 Construction 153 235 
 Hotels and restaurants 128 191 
 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 44 43 
 Other business activities 28 74 
 Land transport; transport via pipelines 23 43 
 Other service activities 13 19 
 Agriculture, hunting and related service activities 12 19 
 Health and social work 11 0 
 Manufacture of food products and beverages 8 28 
 Real estate activities 8 17 
 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
retail sale of automotive fuel 8 19 
 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 6 6 
 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of 
personal and household goods 6 103 
 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 4 17 
 Manufacture of other non metallic mineral products 4 11 
 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel 
agencies 0 6 
 58 
 
Table 4. Exit and Entry Sectors (cont.) 
Panel b. Entry Foreign Natives 
 Agriculture, hunting and related service activities 15 29 
 Construction 162 231 
 Health and social work 16 25 
 Hotels and restaurants 115 154 
 Land transport; transport via pipelines 16 27 
 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 11 18 
 Manufacture of food products and beverages 14 28 
 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing 0 8 
 Manufacture of other non metallic mineral products 6 9 
 Manufacture of wood, products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 4 0 
 Other business activities 85 105 
 Other service activities 5 10 
 Real estate activities 5 10 
 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of 
personal and household goods 36 54 
 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
retail sale of automotive fuel 12 21 
 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 33 33 
 
The results of our first regressions are reported in Table 16. Column (1) 
displays the results of estimating a probit model using the unmatched sample and 
including a dummy variable that indicates whether an individual is a foreigner or not. 
This foreign dummy is positive indicating that, on average and unconditionally, 
foreign workers are more likely than native ones to leave paid work to engage in 
entrepreneurship, which is consistent with the observation that immigrants are often 
more entrepreneurial than native individuals. However, this result does not hold after 
controlling for individual characteristics, as we can see in column (2) that foreigners 
are less likely than natives to switch to entrepreneurship. Thus, we ran similar 
regression in the matched sample we obtained following the methods described 
above. Results are shown in columns (3) - (4) and reveal that foreigners are less likely 
to switch to entrepreneurship whether or not we control for individual characteristics. 
That is, the disadvantages that foreign individuals have may prevent them from 
leaving paid employment to engage in entrepreneurship. Moreover, these liabilities 
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seem to outweigh the advantages foreigners may have over natives in entrepreneurial 
activities. 
Table 16. Probability of Entrepreneurship: Individual Characteristics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Unmatched Sample Matched Sample Matched Sample 
	            Native Foreign t Stat. 
Foreign 0.024* -0.063*** -0.098*** -0.111*** 
  	   (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) 









(0.012) (0.015) (0.018) 









(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) 




0.832*** 0.769*** 0.930*** 1.14 
	   	  
(0.008) 
	  
(0.070) (0.096) (0.104) 




-0.073*** -0.013 -0.166*** 3.26 
	   	  
(0.005) 
	  










(0.022) (0.029) (0.035) 









(0.686) (1.022) (0.986)  































(107.991) (145.277) (163.948)  
Constant -2.810*** -3.357*** -2.754*** -3.787*** -3.751*** -4.184*** 1.00 
  (0.005) (0.048) (0.029) (0.211) (0.277) (0.330)   
Log Likelihood -189336.3 -176258.5 -9765.4 -9428.1 -9293.8  
Number of Obs. 11881701 11574001 508503 493986 477288   
Note: The linear and quadratic terms of schooling and age are not jointly significant: χ2 statistics of 
0.81 and 0.08 respectively. 
Significance is indicated as follows  * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.001 (two tailed tests). 
	   
Results concerning the coefficients estimated for individual characteristics in 
columns (2) and (4) are not surprising. The higher the wages individuals earn the less 
likely they are to switch from wage employment to entrepreneurship. Although higher 
wages may allow individuals to face smoother financial constraints when switching to 
entrepreneurship, they also represent a higher opportunity cost for those leaving wage 
employment. Our result suggests that the opportunity cost effect dominates 
individuals’ decisions to switch to entrepreneurship (Amit et al., 1995). Consistent 
with Minniti and Nardone (2007), we find that male individuals are more likely to 
switch to entrepreneurship than females. Education decreases the probability of 
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entrepreneurship until around 5 schooling years and increases it for higher educational 
levels. As education may develop or increase the skills necessary to evaluate market 
opportunities (Robinson & Sexton, 1994), individuals with higher education have a 
higher probability of switching to entrepreneurship. The effect of age upon the 
probability of entrepreneurship peaks at around 35 years old and decreases thereafter, 
that is, younger individuals are more likely to start a firm (Lévesque & Minniti, 2006; 
Minniti & Arenius, 2005). Industry characteristics also determine the probability of 
entrepreneurship, as industry dummies are jointly significant (χ2(69)=245.95, 
p<0.0001). 
We account for three possible types of experience that individuals may have in 
the host country: experience in the labor market, entrepreneurial experience and the 
tenure they have in a firm before deciding switch or not to entrepreneurship. While 
experience in the labor market does not significantly affect the probability of 
individuals switch to entrepreneurship, specific experience in a firm and 
entrepreneurial experience will affect the probability of individuals leave paid 
employment to engage in entrepreneurship. Those with longer tenures in a firm have a 
lower probability of switching to entrepreneurship. Workers’ tenure in a firm is an 
indicator of the quality of the match between employer and employee. Therefore, 
better employer employee matches are likely associated with longer tenures and less 
incentives to leave the firm. Incentives to leave a job to engage in entrepreneurship 
may be related to individuals’ predisposition to engage in entrepreneurship. Previous 
engagement in entrepreneurship may be indicative of individuals inclination towards 
this type of activity an also that they already have some knowledge on how to do it. 
Consistent with this premise, we find that those who were previously engaged in 
entrepreneurial activities have higher probabilities of leaving their jobs to engage in 
entrepreneurship again. 
We discussed earlier that foreigners might have disadvantages and advantages 
relative to natives. It is reasonable to conjecture that these disadvantages and 
advantages shape the behavior of foreigners and thus our explanatory variables may 
have different effects upon the probability of foreigners and natives switch to 
entrepreneurship. To account for this possibility, we allow the variables in regression 
of Column (4) to have different effects on the probability of entrepreneurship of 
foreigners and natives. We replicate the regression in column (4) including 
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interactions between dummies for foreigners and natives and each one of the 
considered variables. Column (5) reports the results of such estimation as well as 
statistics for the equality of coefficients for native and foreign individuals (joint tests 
for the linear and quadratic effects of Schooling and Age). 
Differences in the coefficients for foreign and native individuals are 
particularly relevant in what concerns wages, previous experience as an entrepreneur 
in the host country and tenure in the firm. The impact of wages upon the likelihood of 
transition to entrepreneurship is negative for both, foreigners and natives. Work 
experience accumulated in the host country reflects skills valued in paid employment, 
which in turn translates into higher wages (Dustman & Costas, 2005) and thus into a 
higher opportunity cost of leaving wage employment. This opportunity cost effect is 
stronger for foreign individuals as we can see from the coefficients associated with 
tenure and wages (χ2 (1)=12.28, p=0.0005 for tenure and χ2 (1)=10.45, p=0.0012 for 
wages respectively). The impact of tenure in the firm upon the likelihood of transition 
to entrepreneurship is also negative for foreign and native individuals. Unfamiliarity 
and lack of legitimacy are additional hurdles foreigners face in the process of finding 
and keeping adequate jobs. This implies that, for a given employment status, 
foreigners are likely to have spent an amount of effort larger than the one spent by 
natives to achieve that status. Therefore, it is costlier for foreigners to renounce a 
given wage or a given job in order to become an entrepreneur. 
Entrepreneurial experience in the host country is of particular importance in 
the case of foreigners as it increases their probability of switching to entrepreneurship 
more than it does for natives (χ2 (1)=3.89, p=0.0486). Individuals with previous 
experience in entrepreneurship are more likely than those without such experience to 
switch to entrepreneurship again (Carroll and Mosakowski, 1987) because they are 
more likely to have a deeper understanding of entrepreneurship and to see it as an 
alternative to wage employment. In the case of foreigners, entrepreneurial experience 
in the host country reflects the additional knowledge they acquired about being an 
entrepreneur in a foreign land. 
Host country experience yields positive coefficients for both foreigners and 
natives with a larger coefficient for foreigners. However, these coefficients are not 
significant. Because we are considering individuals who already have a job and we 
are controlling for their tenure and previous entrepreneurial experience in the host 
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country, the benefits of host country experience may not be as evident as they would 
be for those just arriving to the host country. In fact, foreigners who already have a 
job must have learned enough about the host country in order to obtain that job. 
Likewise, foreigners who already had some entrepreneurial experience in the host 
country must have acquired some knowledge about how to do it. 
 
6.2 – Differences between home and host countries  
Our previous results reveal that foreigners are less likely than natives to switch 
to entrepreneurship. This suggests that the impact of liabilities of foreignness 
dominates the impact of its possible creativity benefits. We argued earlier that 
differences between home and host countries would affect foreigners’ entrepreneurial 
behavior as they can, on the one hand, exacerbate the liabilities foreigners experience 
and, on the other hand, allow foreigners to exploit opportunities missed by natives.  
We extend our model to include variables accounting for differences between 
individuals’ home and host countries, in order to study the impact of such differences 
upon the probability of switching to entrepreneurship. Results are displayed in Table 
17. Political and cultural distances between home and host countries increase the 
probability that foreigners switch to entrepreneurship. Adaptation in the host country 
is harder for those that are more unfamiliar with it. Thus, it may be more difficult for 
such individuals to find adequate job matches. For example, across OECD countries, 
almost 15% of employed immigrants have temporary contracts, 16% work in low-
skilled jobs and 28.3% of the highly educated immigrants are overqualified for the 
jobs they hold. For natives these figures are 10%, 7% and 17.6% respectively (OECD, 
2012). This implies that adaptation and integration is harder for individuals from 
countries that are more dissimilar to the host country. As a consequence, individuals 
from countries that are less similar to the host country may face greater discrimination 
and have worse job matches than individuals from more similar countries. This, in 
turn, increases the relative attractiveness of entrepreneurship, as discrimination may 
induce entrepreneurship among those who feel discriminated against (Constant and 
Zimmerman, 2006). On the other hand, as we argued earlier, foreigners’ detachment 
from the prevailing norms and attitudes within the host country may work in their 
favor. Therefore, those from dissimilar countries may be at a better position vis-a-vis 
foreigners from similar countries, to exploit opportunities resulting from such 
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detachment. Some of these opportunities arise from the greater relative advantage 
over natives in serving consumers of the same nationality or ethnic group than 
individuals from similar countries. Therefore, the relative gains of entrepreneurship 
are higher for those coming from countries that are more different from the host 
country than they are for those from similar countries. 
Our results suggest that individuals from wealthier countries are more likely to 
become entrepreneurs than those from poorer countries. Individuals from high-
income countries are more likely to have access to financial resources than those from 
poorer countries. For example, in the US, immigrants from Western Europe, 
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand were found to have higher levels of total wealth 
compared to other immigrant groups (Akresh, 2011). Personal savings are a major 
source of funding for those engaging in entrepreneurship. They are of particular 
importance to foreigners as they may be discriminated against in credit markets. 
Those from high-income countries are thus less likely to be financially constrained 
and excluded from entrepreneurship than those from low-income countries. For 
example, Fairlie & Meyer (1996) find that self-employment rates are higher among 
foreigners from groups with an advantage in terms of capital. 
The level of economic development of individuals’ countries of origin can 
determine how successfully they assimilate in wage employment. Haley and Taengnoi 
(2011) found that, in the US, the degree to which individuals can transfer the skills 
they acquired abroad is lower for those from less developed countries vis-a-vis those 
form developed countries. As a consequence, immigrants from less developed 
countries tend to be less successful in wage employment than those from developed 
countries. Therefore, the skills of individuals from less developed countries may be 
perceived in the host country as less legitimate or even inferior to the skills of those 
from developed countries (Chiswick & Miller, 2012). In column (5) of Table 17 we 
allow GDPpc to have different impacts upon the probability of entrepreneurship 
depending on whether it is above of below the GDPpc of Portugal. Individuals from 
countries less developed than Portugal are more likely to switch to entrepreneurship 
the higher the GDPpc of their home countries, while the opposite happens for 
individuals from countries more developed than Portugal. This suggests that 
individuals from less developed countries experience greater liabilities in wage 
employment than those from developed countries. Thus, the relative attractiveness of 
entrepreneurship appears to be higher for those coming from less developed countries, 
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despite the higher financial constraints they face. Entrepreneurship may be a way to 
capture returns on skills that are not recognized in wage employment. 
Table 17. Probability of Entrepreneurship: Home Country Characteristics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 


















0.084*** 0.091*** 0.184*** 
 
  
(0.018) (0.022) (0.031) 
GDPpc Above PT×ln(GDPpc/10000) 
    
-1.024** 
     
(0.338) 
GDPpc Above PT 
    
0.146 
     
(0.262) 
ln(Experience) 0.021 0.064** 0.034 0.081** 0.070** 
 
(0.021) (0.028) (0.021) (0.029) (0.029) 
Tenure in Firm -0.050*** -0.055*** -0.051*** -0.057*** -0.050*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) 
Previously Entrepreneur 0.872*** 1.156*** 0.887*** 1.102*** 1.130*** 
 
(0.114) (0.160) (0.114) (0.160) (0.160) 
ln(Wage) -0.253*** -0.155** -0.269*** -0.205*** -0.154** 
 
(0.044) (0.047) (0.045) (0.048) (0.049) 
Male 0.208*** 0.204*** 0.227*** 0.201*** 0.190*** 
 
(0.039) (0.043) (0.039) (0.043) (0.044) 
Schooling/100 -2.727** -3.822** -3.360** -2.713** -2.714** 
 
(1.215) (1.281) (1.201) (1.302) (1.310) 
Schooling²/10000 17.409** 25.266** 19.821** 15.159* 16.878* 
 
(8.445) (8.980) (8.414) (9.198) (9.233) 
Age/1000 58.497*** 42.953** 58.036*** 51.466*** 46.972** 
 
(13.437) (15.460) (13.431) (15.614) (15.674) 
Age²/1000000 -778.773*** -558.569** -744.214*** -697.745** -635.717** 
 
(181.773) (211.510) (181-254) (213.844) (214.432) 
Constant -5.382*** -4.371*** -5.243*** -4.716*** -4.341*** 
 
(0.397) (0.435) (0.396) (0.441) (0.446) 
Log Likelihood -2722.6 -2327.9 -2738.2 -2300.0 -2283.7 
Number of Obs. 132829 106839 132829 106839 106839 
Significance is indicated as follows  * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.001 (two tailed tests). 
 
7. Conclusion 
We study the transition of foreign and native individuals from paid 
employment to entrepreneurship. We see how individuals’ characteristics affect their 
entrepreneurial decisions and how differences between home and host countries affect 
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the entrepreneurial behavior of foreigners. Our interest is on foreigners that choose to 
engage in entrepreneurship rather than in those that resort to entrepreneurship because 
they excluded from other occupational alternatives. 
We find that, after controlling for individual characteristics, foreign 
individuals have lower probabilities of switching to entrepreneurship when compared 
to natives. This suggests that foreign individuals may have disadvantages relative to 
natives that affect their entrepreneurial behavior. Foreigners are less familiar with the 
local environment and local agents may discriminate them because they see foreigners 
as less legitimate than natives. 
Our results suggest that foreigners have an opportunity cost of leaving wage 
employment higher than natives. Tenure in the firm and wages decrease the 
probability of individuals switch to entrepreneurship and this effect is stronger in the 
case of foreigners. Foreigners are required to spend an additional effort in learning 
about the host country and building legitimacy and thus they are less likely than 
natives to abdicate of a given job or a given wage in order to become an entrepreneur. 
Entrepreneurial experience in the host country increases the probability of both 
natives and foreigners switch to entrepreneurship again but the effect is stronger for 
the latter. 
Individuals’ country of origin affects their probability of switching to 
entrepreneurship. Individuals from countries culturally and politically more dissimilar 
from the host country have higher probabilities of engaging in entrepreneurship. This 
suggests that the relative value of entrepreneurship is higher for individuals from 
dissimilar countries than for those from similar countries. Individuals from less 
developed countries are more likely to switch to entrepreneurship the wealthier their 
country of origin is, while for those from countries more developed than the host 
country the opposite happens. Host country’s employers may perceive the skills of 
individuals from less developed countries as less legitimate than the skills of those 
from developed countries. Thus, despite the higher financial constraints they face, 
individuals from less developed countries may engage in entrepreneurship in order to 
obtain a better return on their skills. 
Many countries have been encouraging entrepreneurship (Román et al., 2013) 
as a mean to boost job creation and economic growth. Such encouragement has 
targeted not only local individuals but also foreigners (OECD, 2010). Migration 
policies facilitating the entry and stay of immigrants willing to create their businesses 
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have played an important role among the measures to encourage entrepreneurship 
among foreigners (OECD, 2010). Our results suggest that along with these migration 
policies, it is also necessary to provide foreigners with tools allowing them to reduce 
or overcome their liabilities. These tools may include training that helps them learn 
about the host country or the promotion of interactions with local actors in order to 
build legitimacy. For example, Hiebert (2008) finds that, although Canada welcomes 
foreign entrepreneurs, their success can be compromised by poor language skills or 
misunderstanding of labor codes and regulations, among others. In addition, measures 
that improve foreigners’ access to credit are also important, as banks are often 
reluctant to finance foreigners because they are associated with a higher risk of 
default. Evidence from the UK shows that providing foreigners with capital and loan 
guarantees promotes the success of their entrepreneurial ventures (Ramsden, 2008). 
Policies supporting the reduction of obstacles to entrepreneurship are 
particularly important for those with greater liabilities. Those from countries that are 
more different from the host country may be more unfamiliar with the local 
environment and face more discrimination. Nevertheless, our results suggest that 
these individuals may also be those that are more likely to start entrepreneurial 
ventures. They may be a source of diverse entrepreneurial skills and thus policies 
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The impact of country of origin and experience in the host 
country upon the survival of firms created by foreigners 
 
Abstract 
We study the survival of firms created by foreigners and reach the following 
findings. Survival of firms created by foreigners is lower than that of comparable 
firms created by natives. Survival of firms created by foreigners is particularly low for 
those originating from less developed countries and from countries for which cultural 
and political distances to the host country are smaller. Previous experience in the host 





Businesses operated by foreigners are now very common in most of the 
developed countries and the numbers have been rising. This is a consequence of the 
increased mobility of individuals in today’s world and the relative high propensity of 
foreigners to create new firms. Between 2001 and 2011 the proportion of foreigners in 
the population increased in 22 of the 24 countries for which the OECD reports data 
for those years, leading to a rise of the overall proportion of foreigners among the 
population from 4.9% to 6.4% (OECD 2013, p. 360-1). During a comparable period 
(from 1998-2000 to 2007-2008), the proportion of self-employed in the OECD 
increased from 12.2% to 12.6% for foreigners, while it remained constant at 12.0% 
for natives (OECD, 2011 p. 144).  
Academics of different disciplines have long paid attention to firms created by 
immigrants (Light 1979, 1984, Wilson & Portes 1980, Waldinger, Ward, & Aldrich 
1985, Borjas 1986, Razin 1988) and these efforts have led to the development of the 
field of immigrant entrepreneurship. Most of the studies in this tradition have focused 
on self-employment by foreigners. Self-employment has largely been seen as a 
response to social exclusion or, more specifically, to discrimination in the labor 
market. While some earlier studies posited that lack of alternatives in the labor market 
would be a leading reason for the creation of firms by immigrants (e.g. Light 1979), it 
has been acknowledged that immigrant firms are diverse (Portes 1995) and that they 
may have comparative advantages in serving certain markets, in particular those that 
are related to their countries of origin (Drori et al. 2009, Zhou 2004). This may be 
either because immigrant entrepreneurs serve their own ethnic communities in the 
host market, giving rise to what is known as “ethnic enclaves” (Wilson & Martin 
1982), or because they specialize in providing natives with products coming from 
their countries and act as “middleman minorities” (Bonacich1973).   
Not all immigrants are poorly educated or live at the margins of the host 
country society, however. An emerging literature has reported that immigrants in the 
U.S. represent an important and increasing share among high skill workers, and that 
they have a high propensity to engage in high-tech entrepreneurship (Saxenian 2002, 
Wadhwa 2007, Kerr 2013). Some immigrants do very well in the host country, as 
reported in 2013 by the Forbes magazine: “This year, nearly one in every ten fortunes 
on The Forbes 400 was created by people born outside of the U.S.” (Forbes 
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9/18/2013). Perhaps due to this perceived success, immigrant entrepreneurs have also 
gone under the radar of many governments, and several countries have designed and 
implemented programs to attract immigrant entrepreneurs. This is the case of Canada 
(cic.gc.ca/startup), U.K. (siriusprogramme.com), and Chile (startupchile.org), and 
others are considering developing similar programs. 
We know, very little on how foreign entrepreneurs perform in comparison to 
locals, however. This is because most of the studies on immigrant entrepreneurship 
focus on a single nationality (Kalnins & Chung (2006) or a small number of 
nationalities (Bates 1997) and few discuss any aspect of performance, including 
survival. In one of the few studies that have examined the survival of immigrant 
businesses, Kalnins & Chung (2006) found that establishments operated by Gujarati 
immigrants with access to high quality resources provided by other members of the 
same community had higher chances of survival than those that did not have such 
access. Because the focus was on a single ethnic group, this study was not able to 
provide any clue on how the survival of those immigrant firms compare to that of 
natives or to that of other immigrant groups. Several studies on domestic 
entrepreneurship have found that the individual characteristics of the founding 
entrepreneurs, such as human capital, age, and gender, affect the chances of survival 
of the new businesses (e.g. Taylor, 1999; Bates, 1990, Gimeno et al., 1997; Boden & 
Nucci, 2000), but none has included nationality of the owner among the explanatory 
variables. Therefore, we know very little on how the survival of firms created by 
foreigners compares with that of their counterparts created by natives or by foreigners 
of different nationalities.  
In contrast, studies in international business developed after Zaheer (1995) 
have argued that foreign owned firms suffer from a liability of foreignness which puts 
them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their domestic counterparts and leads to increased 
chances of exit of foreign firms relative to those of local firms. While the liability of 
foreignness literature has arisen with the multinational corporation in mind, we argue 
that this liability largely resides in the persons that make decisions at firms. 
Entrepreneurial firms created by foreigners may thus be particularly adequate to 
appraise the effect of the liabilities of foreignness, as the influence of the owner is 
paramount in such firms and they are less likely to enjoy the “ownership advantages” 
enjoyed by multinationals that allow them to profitably do business in countries other 
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than their own and that may confound the identification of the aforementioned 
liabilities (Nachum, 2010a).  
In this paper we analyze the survival of firms that were created and run by 
foreigners in Portugal during the period 2002 – 2007. We focus neither on those 
individuals who may enter self-employment because they are excluded from society 
or labor market in the host country, nor on those who create new businesses to take 
advantage of their uncommon skills. Instead, we examine common individuals who 
create standard firms that get involved in normal businesses and that represent the 
bulk of new entrepreneurial businesses creation by foreigners. Our dataset includes 
foreign entrepreneurs from 40 nationalities, which enables us to analyze the effect of 
country of origin and see if the patterns that we uncover are specific to some 
nationalities in particular or if they hold across the board. We also evaluate the impact 
of the length of the experience of foreigners in the host country as a factor that 
diminishes the liability of foreignness.  
Before proceeding any further, it is convenient to be clear about our unit of 
observation. Because we want to focus on entrepreneurial firms, from the whole set of 
newly created firms, we retained only those in which there was at least one owner 
actively working in the firm. This excludes new ventures that are subsidiaries of other 
firms or those that are owned by a set of investors that do not have a direct activity in 
the firm. We selected all of those firms whose owners are all reported to be foreign 
and selected a comparison sample of firms whose owners are all Portuguese. 
Foreignness is defined by citizenship rather than by place of birth. This is due to data 
constraints. However, since immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon in 
Portugal, the distinction between immigrants and foreigners is likely to be less 
pronounced than it is in countries that have experienced immigration for much longer 
periods. 
Our foreign entrepreneur is not the typical immigrant considered in the 
immigration entrepreneurship literature. All of our new firms employ paid labor, 
which also excludes many of those that might resort to self-employment due to lack of 
opportunities in the labor market.  In addition, before creating these firms, most of the 
entrepreneurs had been in the country for some time and had worked legally as wage 
employees in other firms. Also, many of our entrepreneurs come from other European 
Union countries. Since citizens of the European Union are legally entitled to move 
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freely within the Union, these are typically individuals that are in the host country 
legally and that can hardly be seen as residing at the society’s margin.  
Having previously worked as employees in other firms and working actively 
in their firms does not exclude the possibility that our entrepreneurs have other 
activities. Still, this makes it less likely that our firms are part of entrepreneurial 
ventures being established simultaneously in several countries, as studied in the 
international entrepreneurship literature (Zahra 2004, Oviatt and McDougall 2005, 
Knight & Cavusgil 2004). Those firms, often called new international ventures or 
born-globals, are likely to possess some kind of “ownership advantage” that persuades 
their owners to start operations simultaneously in several countries and that may 
confound the identification of the liabilities of foreignness. 
Although our work does not focus on these firms or on multinationals, by 
putting the individual at the center of the liabilities of foreignness, our results may 
also be relevant for these types of firms, given the prominent role that entrepreneurs 
play in many new international ventures and the need that multinationals have to staff 
their subsidiaries. The literatures on new international ventures and on multinationals 
have acknowledged that the international experience of individual managers can be 
important for the strategy and success of these firms, and that to some extent, it can be 
a substitute for the lack of international experience of firms  (e.g. Reuber & Fischer 
1997, Sapienza, Autio, George, & Zahra 2006, Sambharya 1996).  Very little, 
however, has been done with respect to the type of country where this experience has 
been gained and our focus on country of origin may prove to be relevant to these 
contexts as well.  
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by reviewing the literature and 
deriving a set of hypotheses on the impact of foreignness upon the survival of 
entrepreneurial firms. We then discuss the Portuguese context in which we conduct 
our analysis, and we subsequently move to the methods employed and discuss the 
data and statistical models used in our analysis. We then present and discuss the 
empirical results. Finally, we offer concluding comments. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Survival 
The literature on the survival of new firms has acknowledged that survival 
depends on the environment in which firms operate, the characteristics of firms, and 
attributes of the founders.  
A literature that occupies a prominent place among these studies is the 
organizational ecology literature. Organizational ecology places great emphasis on the 
dynamics of the populations over the long run. In this approach, population density 
(the number of firms in the population) is the most important determinant of how 
favorable conditions are for new entrants. When the numbers are small (low density) 
an increase in the number of firms operating in a market translates into increased 
legitimacy and favors survival. At greater numbers (high density) the effect of 
competition dominates. Further increases in the number of firms exacerbate 
competition, and this translates into increased mortality (see, e.g., Hannan & Carrol 
1992, Carroll & Hannan 2000). Among the other features of the environment that 
affect the survival of firms, industry and location are probably those that have 
received the most attention. Different industries may have different competitive 
conditions, operate under different technological regimes, and be in different stages of 
the industry development, and firms in different locations may confront different cost 
conditions and different access to buyers (see e.g. Stearns et al. 1995, Audretsch & 
Mahmood 1995, Agarwal & Sarkar 2002). 
Another aspect of the environment in which firms compete that is potentially 
relevant for the survival of new entrepreneurial firms is the characteristics of the 
nation in which these new entrepreneurial ventures are started. There have been many 
studies comparing entrepreneurship in different countries, but comparative studies on 
survival are scarce. In a recent survey Terjesen, Hessels, & Li (2013) covered 259 
studies published between 1989 and 2010, comparing different aspects of 
entrepreneurship across countries, but survival was not among the topics that were 
identified in the survey. Two studies have investigated the determinants of the 
longevity of entrepreneurial ventures in different countries. Millán, Congregado, & 
Román (2012) investigated the impact of public policy, while Williams (2004) 
covered different attitudes toward child care. In both cases, the analysis is restricted to 
self-employment and to Europe, presumably because there is a lack of comparable 
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data across a larger number of countries. The same reason probably lies behind the 
lack of such comparative studies on the survival of firms. To the best of our 
knowledge, a study by Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, & Scarpetta (2009) is the only that 
has attempted to compare the survival of firms across countries. This was based on a 
pioneering effort by the World Bank and the OECD that collected data on the survival 
of firms in 14 countries, including Western and Eastern European countries, the USA, 
and Latin American countries. The findings of this study indicate that Eastern 
European countries tend to have the highest survival rates, while Latin American 
countries have the lowest, and Western Europe and the USA are somewhere in the 
middle. Still, there is some within group variability in the groups above. Given the 
relatively small number of countries in the project, strong conclusions cannot to be 
derived.  
Two of the characteristics of firms that have received greater attention are firm 
size and firm age, many studies having found a relationship between survival and size 
and age (Dunne, Roberts, & Samuelson, 1989; Audretsch & Mahmood, 1994; Mata & 
Portugal, 1994; Mitchell, 1994; Haveman, 1995; Sharma & Kesner, 1996).  
Organizational ecologists have thoroughly examined the relationship between age and 
survival, having suggested different mechanisms for different relationships between 
age and survival, and coining terms for them such as liabilities of newness, 
adolescence, senescence, and obsolescence (see Carroll & Hannan 2000 chap. 13). 
While organization ecologists have often suggested that liabilities of smallness may 
be variants of liabilities of newness (see Carroll & Hannan 2000 chap. 14), 
economists have offered different explanations for an effect of size that is independent 
of age. Larger firms may have cost advantages due to economies of scale (Audretsch 
& Mahmood, 1994) and firm size may be related to access to superior resources 
(Lucas, 1978), or operation under lower constraints (Zingales, 1998).  
Finally, the role of founders upon the survival of their firms has also been 
extensively examined, with human capital (education and experience) receiving the 
greatest attention (e.g. Taylor, 1999; Bates, 1990, Brüderl et al. 1992 Gimeno et al., 
1997; Boden & Nucci, 2000, Gimmon & Levie 2010, Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & 
Woo 1994, Dencker et al. 2009, Agarwal, et al. 2004). Other studies have focused on 
gender (Boden & Nucci 2000), and others on strategies adopted by founders (Brüderl 
et al 1992, Gimmon & Levie 2010), including actions taken by domestic founders to 
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legitimize their organizations (Delmar & Shane 2004). None of these studies have 
attempted to discriminate between native and foreign entrepreneurs.  
 
Immigrant entrepreneurship 
The prevalence of entrepreneurial ventures among foreigners in a country has 
long been studied in the field of immigrant and ethnic entrepreneurship. The focus of 
this literature is on self-employment by immigrants, and these have been found to be 
more prone to start entrepreneurial ventures than are natives. Immigrant communities 
are typically viewed in this literature as being, to some extent, at the margins of 
society in the host country (Portes 1995). While this literature initiated in the United 
States, considerable attention to immigrant entrepreneurship has also been paid in 
Europe in more recent times (Clark &Drinkwater 1998, 2000 Kloosterman & Rath 
2001, Hjerm 2004, Constant & Zimmermann 2006, Baycan-Levent  & Nijkamp 
2009).  
Earlier studies in this tradition posited that immigrants would resort to self-
employment as a consequence of discrimination in the labor market and as a response 
to lack of alternatives (Light 1979). More recent studies have acknowledged that the 
minorities make more money in self-employment than in wage employment, and this 
evidence has been indicated as pointing out that self-employment is a rational choice 
between alternatives rather than a response to the inexistence of alternatives (Portes 
1995). As this finding contrasts with what has been found in the comparison between 
earnings of self-employed and wage earners in general (Hamilton 2000), it suggests 
that the hurdles that the typical immigrant confronts in entrepreneurship are, at least, 
less important than discrimination encountered in the labor market, and self-
employment would be a means for immigrants to make their way toward wage work 
(Raijman & Tienda 2000).  
The type of firm that is commonly considered in this literature has a strong 
ethnic component. In addition, the countries of origin of these immigrant 
entrepreneurs are typically much less developed than the host countries where they 
create their entrepreneurial ventures. For example, the nationalities mentioned for the 
typical immigrant entrepreneur in the USA are Chinese, Mexican, Indian, Dominican, 
Korean, Cuban, and Vietnamese (Portes & Rumbaut 2006 p. 21).  Studies in this 
tradition pay great attention to the social processes associated with the national 
community to which immigrants belong to explain different degrees of success of 
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firms created by immigrants of these communities in the host country (Roberts 1995, 
Raijman & Tienda 2000). Many use a small number of nationalities (e.g. Bates, 1997) 
or even narrower samples, as in the case of one of the few studies on the survival of 
immigrant firms (Kalnins & Chung 2006), which focuses on a single US state, a 
single industry, and a single ethnic minority. 
We extend this analysis in a direction that has been suggested in the 
international business literature. This literature emphasizes foreignness as such, and 
differences in the home countries as determinants of the performance of foreign firms 
and of their survival. This literature suggests that foreignness creates specific 
liabilities, arising from unfamiliarity with the local environment, lack of legitimacy, 
constraints imposed by host countries, and costs associated with distance such as 
coordination costs (Zaheer 1995). These liabilities affect the ability of foreign firms to 
do business in a host country and may lead foreign firms to be less profitable (Zaheer, 
1995), exhibit poorer performance (Miller & Parkhe, 2002), and confront greater exit 
rates (e.g. Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997) than their domestic counterparts.  
The extent to which the liabilities apply depends on the specific persons that 
make decisions in firms. First, as pointed out by Grant (1996), knowledge exists only 
in individuals. And indeed, Mezias (2002) found that, while foreign firms operating in 
the US faced more labor suits in American courts than did their local counterparts, the 
presence of Americans among the foreign firm’s top officers reduced the number of 
these labor suits. In addition, while the concept of liabilities of foreignness was 
developed with the multinationals in mind, recent work has started to recognize that 
the liabilities of foreignness may apply to individuals as well. For example, Harvey et 
al. (2005) suggested that individual “inpatriate” managers, that is foreigners working 
at establishments located in the home country of organizations, may be stigmatized by 
native managers as a consequence of their foreignness, and Mezias & Mezias (2007) 
showed that foreigners working in one US firm get lower salary increases as 
compared with comparable US citizens working in the same firm. While these two 
examples suggest discrimination, other mechanisms may apply. Fang et al. (2013) 
found that the performance of immigrants relative to that of natives in their job-search 
efforts is particularly bad when they use rich media job-search methods, such as social 
networks and recruitment agencies, in comparison to when they rely on lean media 
job-search methods, such as newspaper ads and the internet. This suggests that the 
liabilities of foreignness come mostly from unfamiliarity with the local environment. 
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This is consistent with the finding by Nee, Sanders, and Sernau (1994) that, as the 
number of years in the US and the number of previous jobs held by Asian immigrants 
increases, they tend to move away from personal ties to find jobs and to increasingly 
rely on more impersonal means for their job search. 
The effect of foreignness may be particularly evident in entrepreneurial firms 
that are created and directly run by foreigners. A key difference between 
entrepreneurial businesses and multinational corporations is the strong influence of 
the founder upon the firm (Barringer et al., 2005). This makes the link between the 
individual founder characteristics and firm outcomes more direct and pronounced in 
the context of entrepreneurial firms than in their multinational counterparts (Chandler 
& Hanks, 1994; Reuber & Fischer, 1997).  
Entrepreneurial firms started by foreigners may suffer from some of the 
liabilities of foreignness, as founders are likely to be somewhat unfamiliar with the 
local environment and to be perceived by natives as less legitimate than those created 
by domestic entrepreneurs. These firms rely on the knowledge possessed by 
entrepreneurs on how to do business rather than on knowledge residing in the 
organization (Shrader, Oviatt, & McDougall, 2000). However, human capital and 
experience of individuals lose value when they go abroad (Friedberg, 2000). Upon 
arrival in a foreign country, even individuals who are experienced in their home 
country will find themselves at a disadvantage relative to locals. Legitimacy, in turn, 
is important for gaining access to critical resources for survival and growth 
(Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002; Rutherford et al., 2009). Foreign entrepreneurs may be at 
a disadvantage here, as discrimination against foreigners seems to be pervasive in 
attitudes toward immigration (Mayda 2006), in the labor market (Chiswick 1978, 
Reimers 1983), and on the part of consumers (Nardinelli & Simon 1990).  
We thus hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 1: Firms created by foreigners exhibit higher exit rates than firms 
created by domestic entrepreneurs. 
Host Country Experience 
In his seminal work, Stinchcombe (1965) suggested that the hazards of new 
firms decrease with age, that is, that new firms suffer from a liability of newness 
because new organizations must spend resources learning about the business 
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operations, developing internal structures and external relations, and making 
themselves acceptable to others (see Hannan et al. 2007, part 2). While subsequent 
research found more complex patterns (Le Mens et al. 2011), the arguments of 
Stinchcombe still hold in these more complex patterns, and are of particular relevance 
for our study because lie at the root of two sources of what have been identified as 
liabilities of foreignness: lack of knowledge and lack of legitimacy.  
Similar to the liability of newness, the liabilities of foreignness tend to 
disappear as foreigners get to know the host country better and increase their 
legitimacy in the eyes of the locals. Zaheer & Mosakowski (1997) find that foreign 
trading rooms are more likely to exit than domestic ones but, with long enough tenure, 
exit rates of foreign trading rooms approach those of their local counterparts. This 
suggests that the costs of doing business abroad decline as firms gain more familiarity 
and legitimacy in the local environment. This effect may apply even among domestic 
firms. Dahl & Sorenson (2012) find that firms operating in locations where their 
founders lived longer tend to survive longer and have greater profits. Given that firms 
operated by these local entrepreneurs show greater profits than others, the result with 
respect to survival appears to stem from greater familiarity with these locations rather 
than from a preference to remain close to family and friends. 
Firms may attempt to build legitimacy by conforming to the local environment 
(Suchman, 1995) and the same applies to individuals. Learning about the host country 
can be seen as a pre-requisite for gaining legitimacy because one cannot conform to 
something one does not know. As learning does not happen overnight, the length of 
stay in the host country plays an important role in the development of capabilities 
applicable to that country (Barkema et al., 1996). The longer the host country 
experience, the easier it is to adapt practices to the local environment (Luo, 1997; 
Delios & Henisz, 2003) and to develop social knowledge and harmonious 
relationships with local actors (Sohn, 1994; Zhou et al., 2007). As a consequence, 
firms that have been in the host country for longer have been found to survive longer 
and perform better than newcomers (Delios & Beamish, 2001, Luo & Peng, 1999).  
While these arguments refer to business units, it is plausible that the length of 
experience of the foreigner business founders in the host country also helps to 
dissipate the liabilities of foreignness. Integration in the host economy over the course 
of the stay in the country has also been found to occur for individuals. Chiswick 
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(1978) showed that there is a gap in the wage earnings of foreign-born individuals 
relative to natives and that this gap narrows over their stay in the host country. The 
narrowing of this gap may come from being better acquainted with the host country 
labor market and being able to better use its mechanisms for job search (Nee, Sanders, 
and Sernau 1994, Fang et al. 2013).  
Because host country experience allows foreign entrepreneurs to reduce 
liabilities related to unfamiliarity and lack of legitimacy, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2: Firms created by foreigners with long host country experiences 
have lower exit rates than those created by foreigners with short host country 
experiences. 
Cultural and political differences between home and host countries 
A major reason why doing business abroad may pose a particular predicament 
is because people in different countries have different attitudes and behaviors and 
different ways of doing business. Since the pioneering work of Hofstede (1983) 
differences in culture have received most of the attention in the literature (see reviews 
in Tihanyi, Griffith & Russell 2005 & Kirkman, Lowe & Gibson 2006). Culture alone 
may, however, be insufficient to capture all the major aspects that shape people’s 
attitudes and behaviors, and other aspects have long been emphasized as well (e.g. 
Goodnow & Hansz 1972, Evans & Mavondo 2002). Political or administrative 
differences between countries’ institutions are widely considered to be important by 
scholars of different traditions (Ghemawat 2001, Berry et al. 2010, Salomon & Wu, 
2012), including economic (North 1991) and organizational (Scott 1995) approaches 
to institutions. The organizational approach distinguishes three dimensions of 
institutions: regulatory, cognitive and normative. “The cognitive and normative 
dimensions of the country institutional context are conceptually close to culture, 
whereas the regulatory dimension is unique to country institutional context and not 
captured by culture” (Kostova, 1999, p. 314). The economic approach to institutions 
distinguishes between formal and informal institutions (North 1991). Formal 
institutions include property rights, constitutions, and laws. These are close to the 
regulatory dimension of the organizational approach, and tend to be associated with 
the political organization of a country. In contrast, informal institutions include 
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sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct and tend to be related 
with the prevailing culture.  
The interaction of agents from different countries creates a two-sided 
relationship between their institutional background and a host country’s institutional 
profile. On the one hand, countries’ institutional profiles affect foreigners’ attitudes 
toward that country (Makino et al., 2004; Meyer et al., 2009). Firms’ choices 
regarding entry and ownership have been found to be affected by factors such as 
corruption, regulations, and expropriation hazards in the host country (Rodriguez et 
al., 2005; Delios & Henisz, 2003; Peng & Heath, 1996), and the performance of 
foreign affiliates has been found to worsen with the level of institutional development 
(Chan et al., 2008). On the other hand, agents’ institutional background influences 
their behavior toward foreign environments. For instance, investors exposed to 
corruption may seek countries where corruption prevails rather than countries 
engaged in deterring this phenomenon (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). 
One important consequence arising from differences between home and host 
countries’ institutions is an exacerbated liability of foreignness (Eden & Miller, 2004; 
Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). The more different home and host countries are, the more 
difficult it is for foreigners to understand and adapt to the local environment (Orr & 
Scott, 2008). Similarly, it is more difficult for local actors to understand foreigners 
and the latter are perceived to be less legitimate (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). 
Foreigners are more likely to face discriminatory treatments inflicted by local 
governments, consumers, and suppliers (Eden & Miller, 2004). This exacerbated 
liability of foreignness may be among the reasons why firms are less likely to enter 
institutionally dissimilar countries (Berry et al., 2010). 
Several authors argue that embeddedness in host country institutions is 
necessary to overcome liabilities associated with being a foreigner or an outsider 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 2009; Henisz, 2003) and isomorphic strategies are often used by 
foreign firms as a means to benefit from compliance with the host environment (e.g. 
Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994). However, foreignness and distance from host country 
need not be a handicap. Institutional distance may also have its own benefits and 
conformity need not always be good for business.  
First, being an outsider may facilitate the adoption of certain profitable 
business practices that are not well accepted by the insiders. Granovetter (1995) 
makes the point that over time traders have been outsiders relative to the society they 
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do business in, largely because “it is difficult to pursue commercial roles within a 
community that is close-knit and stresses a norm of mutual help and obligation [… 
and …] any cultural device that can decouple one group from another may facilitate 
commerce” (Granovetter 1995 p. 146-148).  
Second, if conformity may help to gain legitimacy, differentiation may reduce 
competition (Deephouse, 1999). Foreigners are in a good position to differentiate their 
strategies from locals’. In Shi and Hoskisson’s (2012 p. 102) words, “being foreign 
can lead to a generation of creative ideas and unorthodox breakthroughs for 
individuals” as creativity is enhanced by familiarity with different contexts (Leung et 
al., 2008). Miller & Eden (2006) show that in environments where competition for the 
same resources is intense, differentiation from the strategies of local firms may 
actually increase the performance of foreign firms. And, indeed, Siegel et al. (2010) 
find that in South Korea less embedded foreign firms were able to recognize that 
women were discriminated against in the labor market and to take advantage of that 
by hiring a disproportionate share of female managers compared to local firms. In the 
same vein, Edman (2009) points out that the ability to escape the norms of the host 
country was critical for Citibank in Japan to develop practices that differed from the 
dominant practices of local firms and that allow it to stay in niches with little 
competition. Using a larger sample of firms, Regnér & Edman (2013) provide 
evidence that the ability to see beyond current norms and regulations enabled 
multinationals to come up with “responses to institutions that are unavailable to 
domestic players”. 
Third, while countries that are institutionally close to the home country may be 
better understood and provide more familiar environments, such a feeling of closeness 
may also hinder relevant learning (O’Grady & Lane, 1996). Embeddedness in host 
country institutions may be useful to overcome liabilities, but if it prevents foreigners 
from exploiting advantages they may have, such embeddedness may itself become a 
liability (Sun et al., 2010). 
While these arguments were originally advanced in the context of 
multinational firms, these effects of country of origin are likely to be even more 
pronounced in the case of entrepreneurial firms. The management practices of 
multinationals have been found to be much more consistent over the world than the 
practices of local firms (Bloom and van Reenan 2010). Multinationals may be able to 
carry the best practices to the host market at the same time that they escape the 
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constraints created by the cultural and political institutions of their countries of origin 
by hiring local executives (Mezias 2002) to an extent that entrepreneurial firms cannot 
imitate. 
As discussed above, we consider both the political and cultural distances as 
instances of institutional distance, and therefore our next two hypotheses are 
formulated as 
Hypothesis 3: Firms created by foreigners coming from countries with a 
greater cultural distance to the host country experience lower exit rates than those 
coming from countries that are close. 
Hypothesis 4: Firms created by foreigners coming from countries with a 
greater political distance to the host country experience lower exit rates than those 
coming from countries that are close. 
Income level in the home country 
The economic development of the home country of the entrepreneurs may 
affect the survival of their firms is that otherwise identical individuals coming from 
different countries are likely to have access to different amounts of resources.  
First, countries with higher incomes tend to have greater variety of products 
available (Funke & Ruhwedel 2001, Falkinger and Zweimüller 1996). Individuals 
coming from higher income countries are therefore likely to be familiar with a wider 
range of products than those coming from lower income countries. While greater 
unfamiliarity with consumers’ habits and preferences in the host country may hinder 
the chances of success, it is arguably more difficult for individuals coming from less 
developed countries to understand more complex consumers than it is for those 
coming from more developed countries to understand less complex consumers. 
Second, productivity varies widely across countries. There is a very strong 
correlation between total factor productivity at the country level and GDP per capita 
(Jones and Romer 2010), which largely comes from  the extent to which management 
practices differ across countries, and the extent to which inferior practices are 
prevalent in the country. In a recent investigation of how management practices vary 
across firms and countries Bloom & Van Reenen (2010 .p 205) report: ”Most of the 
 90 
difference in the average management score of a country is due to the size of the 
"long tail" of very badly managed firms. For example, relatively few U.S. firms are 
very badly managed, while Brazil and India have many firms in that category. 
“ Individuals coming from high income countries are thus more likely to have had 
contact with good management practices (both as managers and as employees) than 
those coming from low income countries. 
Finally, entrepreneurs coming from low income countries are also likely to 
have poorer access to financial resources than those coming from high income 
countries. Access to funding has been found to play an important role in determining 
entrepreneurial survival, with easier access to capital leading to better survival 
chances (Taylor, 1999; Bates, 1990; Gimeno et al., 1997). In general, entrepreneurs 
rely on their personal savings as a primary source of funding. Obtaining external 
funding can be particularly challenging for foreign entrepreneurs, since investors 
seem to prefer to invest in local firms rather than in foreign ones because they are 
more familiar with the former than with the latter (Chan et al., 2005). Foreign 
entrepreneurs may therefore face an aggravated liability of foreignness in capital 
markets (Bell et al., 2012). Being financially constrained is especially likely for those 
entrepreneurs that had fewer opportunities to accumulate wealth, as is the case of 
those coming from lower income countries.  
Note that, unlike Tsang & Yip (2007), for example, we are not arguing for an 
effect of “economic distance”. Unlike distance, income per capita is directional.  A 
country with 15,000 dollars of income per capita and another with 5,000 dollars per 
capita would be at the same “income distance” from a third country with 10,000 
dollars of income per capita. Yet, the amount of resources available in the two 
countries would be very different. Also, political and cultural distances are multi-item 
scales while income per capita is a single-item variable. 
These arguments lead us to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: Firms created by foreigners coming from countries that have 





Our study is performed with data on foreigners that started their businesses in 
Portugal. Immigration in Portugal is relatively recent, the proportion of foreigners 
recorded in the Population Censuses having increased from 1% in 1991 to 2% in 2001 
and 4% in 2011. Most of the countries for which entrepreneurship by foreigners has 
been analyzed are wealthy countries and immigrants come from less developed 
countries. In contrast, Portugal is a mid-income country, one of the poorest in Western 
Europe. While most foreigners come from relatively low-income countries, there is a 
fair number of people coming from countries whose incomes are higher than 
Portugal’s and many of the individuals that start new firms come from these countries. 
More than 20% of the total number of immigrants in both 2001 and 2011 were 
citizens of another European Union country and, as we shall see later in the paper, 
citizens of these countries are overrepresented among those that create new 
businesses. The increase in the number of immigrants in the last decade came from 
countries that were not the traditional sources of immigration. As a result, citizens 
from Portuguese speaking African countries that were dominant (56%) in 2001, make 
up no more than 25% of the total number of foreign citizens in 2011, while those from 
Brazil were 14% and 29% in the same periods.  
Two different laws regulate the presence of citizens from European Union and 
other countries. European Union citizens have very few restrictions, as Portugal is a 
member of the European Union. While a new law from 2006 replaced the earlier one 
from 1993, no substantive changes were made to the freedom of residence and of 
establishment of business initiatives. Non-European citizens are subject to greater 
number of restrictions, namely to visa requirements and residence permits. While the 
visa and residence requirements for setting up an entrepreneurial activity were 
somewhat intricate (see Oliveira 2008), the most important point for our study is that 
these requirements remained essentially unchanged between 1998 and 2007, when a 
new foreigners’ law was passed (see Peixoto, Sabino & Abreu 2009 for a discussion 
of immigration laws up to 2007). In particular, the 2007 law created a new type of 
residence permit that was granted to those that wanted to come to the country with the 
explicit goal of starting a business activity (with or without employees) from the 
beginning of their stay. While the new law was published in July 2007, most of its 
effects took place only in 2008. Indeed, from August to December 2007, only 24 
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residence permits of this kind were issued, a number that compares to 602 permits 
issued in 2008 (see Oliveira, 2010, p. 131). As the firms that we analyze were created 
in the period 2002-2007 and our data refer to the month of October of each year, it is 
unlikely that the firms in our sample were affected by this change of regime.  
Individuals entering Portugal as foreigners may apply to acquire Portuguese 
citizenship, provided they meet the requirements specified in the nationality law, of 
which being married to a Portuguese citizen for at least three years or residing legally 
in the country for a minimum period of time are probably the most relevant. A new 
nationality law that was passed in 2006 made naturalization easier. The minimum 
period of residence was reduced from ten to six years (previously only the citizens 
from Portuguese speaking countries could apply after six years) and the 
administrative process was expedited. During the period under study, the total number 
of persons who were naturalized is small: between 2002 and 2006, the numbers of 
those that acquired Portuguese nationality were between 939 and 2222 per year. In 
2007 naturalizations reached a record of 6020, as a consequence of the new 
nationality law. Still, this compares with a total population of 10 million and a stock 
of foreign residents that varied between 200 thousand and 400 thousand.  
The unit of our analysis is the firm created and operated by foreigners. Our 
operational definition requires that the firm employ paid labor and therefore excludes 
the self-employed or those ventures that employ only the entrepreneur and unpaid 
family workers. The number of firms such as ours is not irrelevant, and has increased 
in importance in comparison with the numbers of self-employed, for both foreigners 
and natives. For natives, the proportion of employers in the population has gone up 
from 3.1% in 1981, to 6.2% in 1991 and to 9.8% in 2001. Foreigners show slightly 
higher figures, but the same evolution (5.1%, 7.7% and 10.2%, respectively). In 
contrast, the proportion of self-employed in the population decreased during the same 
period. Comparable figures for the self-employed are 15.2%, 13.1% and 6.1% for 
natives and 8.9%, 11.4%, and 4.5% for foreigners (Oliveira 2008, p. 108). In the 
beginning of our period of observation, therefore, this type of venture corresponds to 
2/3 of the total number of business ventures that were created by foreigners, and this 
proportion has been increasing over time. 
These business ownership rates (employers and self-employed) are somewhat 
higher than in most developed countries, but are in line with what has been observed, 
not only in other Southern European countries, but also in countries such as Ireland, 
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Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Baptista & Thurik 2007). New firm creation 
and survival is also in line with the average rates in the European Union. Birth rates in 
2001 were 7.5% in Portugal and 8.3% on average in the EU. Survival rates after two 
years were reported to be 72% in Portugal, which compares to a minimum of 64% in 




The data used in this study come from Quadros de Pessoal, a dataset that is obtained 
from a mandatory annual survey conducted by the Portuguese Ministry of 
Employment covering all firms employing paid labor in Portugal. The dataset 
includes information on all the individuals working at each firm, including their 
nationality and occupational status, which distinguishes between employees and 
employers (business owners). Business owners are included only if they do some 
work at the firm, thereby excluding individuals that may have a passive investment in 
the firm. In addition, the data have a longitudinal nature with unique numbers 
identifying firms and individuals over time. Such characteristics make this dataset a 
unique and excellent source to compare entry and survival of firms created by foreign 
and domestic entrepreneurs. We identify new firms by locating the first year their 
identifier appears in the data and using the data on individuals we identify the owners 
of such firms and their nationality.  
We track almost 100,000 new firms during the period 2002-2007. Although 
data are available from 1985 to 2009, we start in 2002 because information about 
nationalities is available only from this year. We stop in 2007 because we define firm 
exit as an absence from the data in at least two consecutive years. For selecting our 
sample of firms created by foreign entrepreneurs, we selected those new firms in 
which all of the owners are foreigners and that remain exclusively owned by 
foreigners while they remain in the sample. For our comparison sample of domestic 
entrepreneurs, we selected those that are exclusively owned by Portuguese individuals 
throughout their lives. We therefore excluded those firms in which some owners are 
foreigners and others are Portuguese and those that, having been created by 
foreigners, were later sold to Portuguese individuals and vice versa. 
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 We identified 1629 new firms as being exclusively owned by foreigners. 
During our observation period the share of foreign entrepreneurs operating in our host 
country increased from around 1% to nearly 2.5%. These figures are consistent with a 
higher propensity of foreigners to become employers when compared to natives 
(OECD, 2010) and with an increase in the entrepreneurial activities of foreigners in 
Portugal. They are also consistent with the data reported above based on the whole 
population of immigrants and natives. 
Foreign entrepreneurs in our sample come from 40 different countries, as 
shown in Figure 3. Some of these firms may have more than one owner, and the 
number of entrepreneurs from each country may, therefore, be higher than the number 
of firms from that country. 
 
Figure 3. Entrepreneurs and Firms by Country of Origin 
Dependent Variable and Estimation Model 
Exit can occur at any date and is therefore a continuous variable. However, in 
our data we observe firms only once a year, and our continuous variable is thus 
observed only at discrete intervals. For modeling survival we therefore use a 
complementary log log (cloglog) model, which has the desirable property of being 
specified for continuous duration processes that are observed only at discrete intervals 
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(Prentice and Gloeckler 1978, Jenkins 1995). Our unit of observation is the firm in 
each year of activity. Firms that are active in our data for several years are included in 
the dataset as different observations, and each of such observations is identified by the 
age of the firm in that year. Our indicator variable is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the firm exits in that year and 0 otherwise. Therefore, a positive coefficient 
associated with a given independent variable indicates that the impact of that variable 
upon exit is positive. 
 
Independent Variables 
We define a firm as foreign if all of its owners are foreign. Our variable 
Foreign Owners is thus a dummy variable taking the value 1 for such firms and 0 
otherwise. A more restrictive sample includes only firms that are created by a single 
entrepreneur. We run the same regressions with such sample and all our results hold. 
For robustness checks we defined several other dummy variables, which 
decompose our Foreign Owners dummy in two. For each nationality, we defined a 
dummy that takes the value 1 for firms of that nationality and 0 otherwise and another 
that takes the value 1 if the firm has foreign owners but not of that given nationality 
and 0 otherwise. We did the same for groups of countries: Portuguese speaking 
countries versus non-Portuguese speaking countries, European Union countries versus 
non-European Union countries, and counties whose income per capita is higher than 
Portugal’s versus those whose income per capita is lower. 
Our measure of experience is the number of years that an individual has been 
in the host country labor market, before he/she creates a particular firm. As our data 
start in 1985, we were able to trace participation in the labor market from that date on. 
Our proxy is a lower bound to the actual experience in the host country. We cannot 
measure with great precision lengths of stay that are very long. Still, we are able to 
accurately measure experience up to 17 years (firms created in 2002 by persons that 
were already in the files in 1985). This is unlikely to be a major problem, as fewer 
than 2% of the foreign entrepreneurs in our sample reveal local experiences greater 
than 17 years. Furthermore, because the data include information on the date each 
person started working in the firm, if someone who is in the files in 1985 started 
working in that firm earlier, we can account for that experience, also. We enter our 
measure of experience in logarithms, which minimizes the effect of this imprecision. 
For robustness checks, we defined classes of experience: 0 experience, greater than 0 
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and not greater than 2 years, greater than 2 and not greater than 4 years, greater than 4 
and not greater than 10 years, and greater than 10 years. Regressions were 
alternatively run with experience measure with these classes. 
In line with earlier literature, we consider political institutions as our relevant 
formal institutions and national culture as our informal institutional component (e.g. 
Salomon & Wu, 2012). We measure political distance using data obtained from Berry 
et al. (2010). Berry et al.’s index combines five political indicator variables: policy-
making uncertainty (institutional actors with veto power), the size of the state (as a 
percentage of GDP), a democracy score, whether or not countries are WTO members, 
and if they belong to the same trading bloc. The rationale to aggregate these indicators 
is that governments with low levels of institutional constraints, low levels of 
democracy, and high levels of state ownership often have low credibility and, as a 
consequence, foreigners perceive a higher political instability in countries with such 
governments (Murtha & Lenway, 1994; Henisz, 2000). High political uncertainty 
leads to policies that are more likely to change arbitrarily and to a country context that 
is more difficult to predict. Consequently, it is more difficult for foreigners to adapt, 
which may negatively affect their performance (Knack & Keeferm 1995). Existing 
commercial relationships between countries may reflect close political ties that are 
expected to encourage the exchange of information. Therefore, those from countries 
with commercial ties with the host country may have greater knowledge about the 
local environment (Brewer, 2007). To take into account political distance for each of 
the owners of the firm, our variable of political distance is averaged across all the firm 
owners. 
Cultural distance is measured using the Kogut and Singh (1988) Index. We use 
this index rather than data provided by Berry et al. (2010) because the latter does not 
include a cultural distance measure for Portugal. Earlier studies have used five 
dimensions to measure cultural distance (see for example Tihany, Griffith, & Russell, 
2005): power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity, and long-
term orientation (Hofstede, 2001). However, a measure for long-term orientation is 
available for only a small number of countries. Therefore, following Kogut & Singh 
(1988), we use the other four dimensions only: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism, and masculinity. This approach to measure cultural distance has been 
widely used (e.g. Shenkar, 2001; Brouthers & Brouthers, 2001).  




where n stands for the number of dimensions included, Iij is the distance score for the 
ith dimension and jth country, Vi is the variance of the score of ith dimension, P 
stands for Portugal and CDj is the national distance between the jth country and 
Portugal. For each firm we averaged cultural distance across firm owners. 
The level of economic development of entrepreneurs’ home country is 
measured by the average of owners’ home countries’ GDP per capita in a given year. 
GDP per capita data are in constant prices of 2000 adjusted for purchasing power 
parity and were collected from the United Nations World Development Indicators 
Database. Researchers (e.g. Tsang & Yip, 2007) and international organizations (e.g. 
United Nations) commonly use this variable to measure the level of economic 
development of countries. One year lagged values of GDP per capita were used in our 
regressions. 
 
Control Variables  
We control for factors related to characteristics of entrepreneurs, firms, 
industry, and economy wide effects that have been found to affect the survival of 
firms.  
The human capital of entrepreneurs has been found to affect the survival of 
firms they create (Bates, 1990; Gimeno et al., 1997) and so we control for such effects 
using entrepreneurs’ schooling, measured by the average number of years of 
schooling of all owners in a firm. The second characteristic we include is 
entrepreneurs’ age, which is calculated by averaging the ages of all owners in each 
firm. Older entrepreneurs are less likely than younger ones to find better outside 
options (Van Praag, 2003). As a result, older entrepreneurs are found to be more 
willing than younger ones to accept lower returns and still continue in business 
(Gimeno et al., 1997). We also include a quadratic term for entrepreneurs’ age to 
account for retirement age (Van Praag, 2003) and for a possible non-monotonic 
relationship with self-employment earnings (Hamilton, 2000). We control for gender 
using the proportion of males among the firm owners. Firms owned by women have 
been found to be smaller and have lower growth (Fischer et al., 1993) and lower 
survival rates than their male-owned counterparts (Boden & Nucci, 2000).  
CDj =






At the firm level we control for firm size and age and for the number of 
owners. Firm size has been found to correlate with firm survival (e.g. Gimeno et al., 
1997; Mata, Portugal, & Guimarães, 1995). Our measure is the number of persons 
employed by the firm and employment is included in logarithms. Age is measured by 
difference between the year in which the firm was created and current time, and enters 
the regressions as a set of dummies. Our observations are concentrated in the earlier 
years of firms’ lives and thus, in line with earlier findings (Mata & Portugal, 1994; 
Mitchell, 1994), we expect that the probability of firm exit decreases as firms age. 
Third, we control for the number of owners in each firm, computed by the sum of all 
persons classified as owner in a firm. The number of owners is also included in the 
regressions in logarithms. Having several owners may indicate that the firm is more 
able to gather resources and therefore to have lower exit rates, as a result (Cressy, 
1996).  
The survival of firms also depends on the conditions in the industry in which 
entry is attempted and also on economy wide conditions (e.g. macroeconomic 
conditions). We control for industry using a set of 62 industry dummies and for 
economy wide conditions with a set of six year dummies. The organizational ecology 
literature suggests that density is an important determinant of the population dynamics 
(Carroll & Hannan 2000) and that density has a curvilinear effect.  We control for 
density effects with the total number of firms whose owners are from one given 
country and the square of that number. 
 
Sample  
Following the procedures described above we identified 1628 firms created by 
foreign entrepreneurs and 94226 firms created by Portuguese ones. The two samples 
are described in columns (1) and (2) of Table 18. The table shows that while 
foreigners have considerably less experience in the host country labor market than do 
domestic entrepreneurs, the other variables do not exhibit big differences and do not 
indicate that foreigners are particularly disadvantaged. The average age is quite 
similar for domestic and foreign entrepreneurs and foreign entrepreneurs have a 
slightly greater number of years of schooling than domestic ones. Foreigners create 
firms that are slightly larger and their firms have fewer owners.  
On average, the income level of the home countries of the foreign 
entrepreneurs is close to that of Portugal, but there is wide variation (for the sample of 
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domestic entrepreneurs, variation in GDP per capita comes only from the time series 
variation in the GDP of Portugal, while for foreigners it comes from both time 
variation and cross-country variation). As seen before, with the exception of China, 
the twelve top nationalities in Figure 3 are either European Union or Portuguese 
speaking countries. Income per capita in the other European countries is considerably 
higher than in Portugal, while both China and Portuguese speaking countries have 
substantially lower GDPs.   
Table 18. Sample Averages at Time of Creation 
	  	   Unmatched Sample  Matched Sample 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
  Domestic Foreign t Stat. Domestic Foreign t Stat. 
Host Country Experience 10.23 2.90 67.18 2.96 2.96 0.011 
 (8.13) (4.27)  (4.33) (4.30)  
Home Country GDPpc 11559.97 10773.73 2.89 11564.22 10583.29 3.55 
 (322.81) (10977.84)  (420.31) (10922.45)  
Owners’ Schooling Years 9.19 10.12 -8.93 10.29 10.08 1.46 
 (4.07) (4.13)  (4.16) (4.15)  
Owners’ Age 39.47 39.15 1.4 39.14 39.07 0.22 
 (10.00) (9.38)  (9.53) (9.42)  
Share of Male Owners 0.70 0.73 -2.27 0.72 0.72 -0.26 
 (0.42) (0.43)  (0.43) (0.43)  
Employment 3.58 3.77 -1.15 3.57 3.79 -0.96 
 (7.62) (6.40)  (6.43) (6.44)  
Number of Owners 1.36 1.16 17.97 1.17 1.17 0.28 
	   (0.66) (0.43)  (0.46) (0.43)  
Number of Firms 94226 1628  1594 1594   
 
Except regarding experience, the differences in firms in the two samples are 
not large (although education and number of owners are significantly different in 
statistical terms). We selected a sample of domestic entrepreneurs that closely 
matches our sample of foreigners, in their experience in the labor market and in the 
sectoral composition and geographic location. For that, we estimated a propensity 
score matching model (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008), using the whole sample of firms 
owned by foreign and domestic entrepreneurs. The idea of the propensity score 
matching model is to estimate the probability of being in the treatment group 
(foreigners in our case) for the whole population and use the estimated probabilities to 
select elements of the control group (domestic entrepreneurs in our case) that are 
similar to those in the treatment group. We modeled the probability of a firm being 
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foreigner owned at the year of founding as a function of variables describing the 
characteristics of the entrepreneurs that created them, namely their age and years of 
education, the number of entrepreneurs in the firm, the proportion of men among 
them, and the size of firm and two sets of dummies corresponding to the industries 
and locations in which the firms operated. Because the probability of being foreign is 
very low, a rare events logit (King and Zeng. 2001) was used to estimate the matching 
model. With the estimated model and the observed characteristics of each individual, 
we predicted the probability that each observation is foreign. We then selected the 
domestic firm whose probability of being foreign is closest to each one of the foreign 
firms, provided that the difference in probabilities was not greater than a small value 
(0.003). Thirty-four foreign firms were excluded, as we could not find a domestic firm 
within such a distance. We were left with samples with identical numbers of foreign 
and domestic firms (1594) that are similar at start-up. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 18 
report the descriptive statistics for these matched samples. The two samples are not 
statistically different for any of the variables in the table, except for GDP per capita, 
which did not enter the matching model. Firms in these two samples were followed 
over time to investigate their patterns of survival. 
Sample correlations between the independent variables are shown in Table 19. 
Two correlation tables are shown, one for the sample of firms started by domestic 
entrepreneurs and the other for those started by foreigners. Most correlation 
coefficients are low, especially in the sample of domestic firms (Political and Cultural 
distances are always zero for the domestic sample and therefore correlations are not 
defined for this sample). In the foreigners’ sample there is a rather high correlation 
between cultural distance and income per capita, which raises concerns with the 
possibility of estimating precisely the effects of income and institutional distances. 
We will be deal with these concerns during the presentation of our results. However, 
not only are the two measures conceptually distinct, there are huge empirical 
differences between the two. For example, China and Cape Verde have the similar 
levels of income per capita and the same applies to the comparison between Germany 
and France. Cultural distance to Portugal however is 2.5 times greater for China than 
for Cape Verde and it is 2 times greater for Germany than for France. Cultural 
distances from Portugal to France and to India are at similar levels and the same 
happens to distances to Brazil and to Mozambique. Yet, income per capita is 40 times 
greater in France than in India and 11 times greater in Brazil than in Mozambique.  
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The results of our first regressions are reported in Table 20. The first column 
shows the results of the estimation of our cloglog model assuming common 
coefficients for domestic and foreign firms and including the dummy variable that 
indicates whether the firm has a foreign entrepreneur or not. Column (2) reports the 
result of estimating a model in which we allow for different effects of the covariates 
upon the survival of the two types of firm. Column (3) reports a more parsimonious 
specification, in which the effects of those variables whose impact upon domestic and 
foreign firms was found to be not statistically different in columns (2) and (3) are 
constrained to be identical. Before looking at the estimated coefficients, note that the 
number of firms in our regressions is 136 firms smaller than the number of firms in 
our sample. This is because some firms were in industries for which the industry 
dummy completely predicts exit and thus cannot be used in the regression. 
The foreign dummy in column (1) is positive and clearly significant, 
indicating that firms owned by foreigners are certainly more likely to exit. The 
coefficient estimate 0.483 is very close to that which was obtained in a model with no 
other covariates (0.492). Evaluated at the means of all the covariates, our model 
predicts that firms for which all the owners are foreigners have a probability of exit 
that is 53% percent higher than those that are owned by domestic entrepreneurs only. 
The same result holds when we restrict the estimation to firms that have a single 
owner (the estimated coefficient is 0.491, implying an increase of 53.5% in the 
probability of exit compared to local firms). These results confirm Hypothesis 1. 
Experience has a negative impact upon exit in this regression, although the 
effect is not statistically significant. We will return to the effect of experience further 
below. The effects of the remaining individual characteristics of the entrepreneurs are 
in line with our expectations. Education decreases the likelihood of exit, but its effect 
is not significant, which can be due to the fact that education increases the ability to 
run the new venture, but also to the opportunity costs for the business owners 
(Gimeno et al. 1997). The effect of age is curvilinear, minimum exit being found at 
the age of 53. Gender, the proportion of males among the owners, is not significant in 
this regression. As to firm characteristics, larger firms and firms with more owners 
involved are less likely to exit. Industry characteristics also matter, as industry 
dummies are jointly significant (χ2(62)=76.79, p=0.0001). 
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Table 20. Regression Results: Determinants of Exit 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Foreign 0.492***  0.279** 
 (0.054)  (0.111) ln(Experience) -0.038 0.014 0.024 
 (0.026) (0.038) (0.035)       ln(Experience) × Foreign  -0.125** -0.121** 
	  
 (0.054) (0.047) Owners’ Schooling Years /10 0.030 0.153 0.017 
 (0.075) (0.116) (0.075)      Owners’ Schooling Years /10 × Foreign  -0.227  
  (0.158)  Owners’ Age /10 -0.584** -0.560* -0.606** 
 (0.191) (0.294) (0.191)      Owners’ Age /10 × Foreign  -0.075  
  (0.394)  Owner's Age2 /100 0.055** 0.058* 0.058** 
 (0.022) (0.035) (0.022)     Owner's Age2 /100 × Foreign  0.000  
  (0.046)  Share Male Owners 0.041 -0.110 -0.175** 
 (0.065) (0.094) (0.087)     Share Male Owners × Foreign  0.347** 0.426*** 
  (0.135) (0.122) ln(Employment) -0.249*** -0.341*** -0.244*** 
 (0.039) (0.059) (0.038)     ln(Employment) × Foreign  0.189**  
  (0.079)  ln(Number of Owners) -0.119 -0.095 -0.151 
 (0.103) (0.147) (0.103)     ln(Number of Owners) × Foreign  -0.010  
  (0.215)  Log Likelihood -3635.522 -3283.723 -3450.752 
Number of Observations 6171 6433 6717 
Number of Firms 3175 3039 3175 
Notes: Regressions include industry dummies, firm age dummies, and year dummies. Standard errors 
in parentheses.  Significance is indicated as follows  * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.001 (two tailed 
tests). 
 
To allow for individual characteristics to have different effects upon exit by 
foreign and domestic entrepreneurs, we run a regression in which each variable is 
interacted with our Foreign variable and column (2) of Table 20 reports the estimated 
coefficients. Regression in this column was restricted to the industries for which we 
could estimate a fixed effect for domestic firms and a separate one for foreign firms. 
Thus, in this column we have a smaller number of observations and do not have an 
estimate for the Foreign dummy. Results reveal that experience and gender (measured 
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by the share of male owners) are the only two variables that exert a statistically 
different impact upon the survival of firms run by domestic and foreign entrepreneurs. 
The two sets of industry effects were also not significantly different and the same 
occurred to the year dummies that account for economy wide variations in survival 
and to firm age effects.  Column (3) then reports the results of estimating the same 
model, but allowing only gender and experience to have different effects for domestic 
and foreign firms. Looking at gender first, our results indicate that while, among the 
Portuguese, males are less likely than females to have their firms closed, the opposite 
occurs with foreigners. A possible explanation for this result lies in the belief that 
male immigrants have greater geographic mobility than do female immigrants, and 
thus tend to have a higher propensity to outmigrate (Lam, 1994). With respect to 
experience in the local labor market, our regression tells us that after taking age and 
education into account, labor market experience has little impact on the exit of firms 
owned by domestic entrepreneurs, but it has a considerable impact upon the 
corresponding foreign firms. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 receives support, suggesting 
that in a domestic setting there is little to be gained from having an additional year of 
experience in the labor market. On the contrary, in a foreign environment such 
additional experience plays an important role because it allows for adaptation to the 
foreign environment.  
Specific estimates for the probability of exit derived from our model (Table 
21) reveal the same picture: the probability of exit remains between 17.5% and 19% 
for firms created by domestic entrepreneurs, regardless of their experience. For 
foreigners these probabilities are estimated to go from 31% immediately upon arrival 
to 24% after ten years in the country. For at least the first ten years in the country, the 
probability of exit is significantly higher for firms owned by foreigners than for firms 









Table 21. Estimated Probabilities of Exit for Different Host Country Labor Market Experience 
Experience  Domestic Foreign t Statistic 
0 0.1747 0.3118 6.0556 
1 0.1785 0.2861 7.7904 
2 0.1803 0.2748 7.8683 
3 0.1814 0.2675 7.1568 
4 0.1823 0.2621 6.3190 
5 0.1830 0.2579 5.5812 
10 0.1853 0.2448 3.4641 
15 0.1867 0.2371 2.5318 
20 0.1878 0.2317 2.0050 
Notes: t statistics are for the equality of the probabilities of exit at the corresponding age. 
 
The finding that the gap in the survival between firms created by foreign and 
domestic entrepreneurs decreases with the length of stay of individuals in the host 
country suggests that the liabilities of foreignness decrease with experience. This is 
consistent with the findings of Zaheer & Mosakowski (1997) and Mata & Portugal 
(2002) that the gap between survival of foreign and domestic firms tends to converge 
as firms get older. These findings were interpreted as being a consequence of foreign 
firms getting more accustomed to the host country over time. We can also test for the 
impact of the age of firms upon survival and see if the experience of running a firm in 
the host country also contributes to a reduction of the liability of foreignness. We re-
estimated the regressions reported in column (3) of Table 20 allowing the age effects 
to differ for domestic and foreign firms and we calculated the exit probabilities of two 
hypothetical firms (one foreign and one domestic) in which firms and entrepreneurs 
would maintain the same characteristics (the sample’s average) during the firms’ 
lifetime. These probabilities are reported in Table 22. The exit rates decrease as firms 
age, although not by very much. The hypothesis of constant exit rates is not rejected 
for foreign firms (χ2 (5)= 8.11, p=0.150) while for domestic firms we can only reject 
it at a 5% significance level (χ2 (5)= 11.99, p=0.035). Firms created by foreigners are 
more likely to exit than those created by locals (χ2 (5)= 66.10, p<0.001), and this does 
not change significantly as firms get older. In fact, we are not able to reject the 
hypothesis that the difference between the effects of firm age for both types of firms 
is constant over time (χ2 (5)=2.29, p=0.807).  
 
 106 
Table 22. Estimated Probabilities of Exit for Firms of Different Ages 
Firm Age Domestic Foreign t Statistic 
0 0.2003 0.3008 6.2514 
1 0.1632 0.2520 4.1073 
2 0.1905 0.2537 1.9596 
3 0.1623 0.2168 1.2649 
4 0.1255 0.2559 2.0785 
5 0.1450 0.2605 1.0817 
Notes: t statistics are for the equality of the probabilities of exit at the corresponding age. 
 
Neither Zaheer & Mosakowski (1997) nor Mata & Portugal (2002) studied 
entrepreneurial firms, nor did they account for the host country experience of those 
managing such firms. Our results relative to experience of the entrepreneurs and those 
relative to the age of firms reveal that firms created by foreigners are more likely to 
exit, and are thus indicative of the existence of a liability of foreignness. However, 
our evidence suggests that this liability decreases more with the duration of the stay of 
the entrepreneur in the host country than with the age of the firm.  This indicates that 
the knowledge accumulated by individuals is a key ingredient to reduce the liability of 
foreignness, something that is consistent with the findings of Mezias (2002) that 
Japanese firms employing top American officers were less likely to suffer from the 
liability of foreignness in the US. 
To discuss the impacts of the differences between host and home countries 
upon the survival of new firms, we now restrict our attention to firms with foreign 
entrepreneurs. We augment our previous specification with Cultural Distance, 
Political Distance, and GDPpc and estimate alternative specifications using different 
combinations of these variables. Results of these estimations, shown in Table 23, are 
performed with 1581 out of the 1594 firms in our sample of foreign entrepreneurs, 
again due to the need of estimating industry effects. The table reports only the 
estimates for the effects of these distances, but regressions included all the variables 
that were included in the previously reported regressions. Results for these variables 










































































































































































































































































































































































Columns (1) to (3) of Table 23 report the results of adding a single variable to our 
benchmark regression and columns (4) to (6) report regressions with sets of two variables. Column 
(7) includes all three variables simultaneously. Results are strikingly robust. All coefficients are 
negative and they are significant in most specifications. As Cultural Distance and (the log of) 
GDPpc are highly correlated, their effects are difficult to estimate precisely. Political Distance is 
always significant regardless of the specification, and its coefficient does not change much. There 
are almost no differences between the estimates from columns (2) and (3) and column (6) and there 
are also no big changes between columns (1) and (2) and column (5).  Looking at the values of the 
log-likelihoods, we can see that columns (5) and (6) are virtually indistinguishable and column (7) 
does not add much relative to either column (5) or (6).   
Overall, the message is very clear. Entrepreneurs coming from countries that are politically 
close to the host country are more likely to exit than those coming from more distant ones. Our 
results thus clearly support Hypothesis 3. Results also support Hypothesis 4, which predicted that 
entrepreneurs coming from countries that are culturally close to the host country are more likely to 
exit than those coming from more distant ones, and Hypothesis 5, which predicted that 
entrepreneurs coming from wealthier countries would exit less. The two latter effects are not easy to 
distinguish, however. 
Table 24 quantifies the impact of each of the institutional distance variables, by evaluating 
the likelihood of exit at different percentiles of the distribution of these variables (the remaining 
variables are all set at the sample’s average). The estimates are evaluated using the coefficients 
from columns (1)-(3), as those from column (7) are measured with low precision. These results do 
not show a clear pattern. Comparing the difference in the estimates at the 25th and 75th percentiles 
the impact of Political Distance is 2.5 percentage points, Cultural Distance is 4 percentage points, 
and GDPpc is 2 percentage points. A similar comparison between the 5th and 95th percentiles yields 
estimates of 7 percentage points for Political Distance,7 percentage points for Cultural Distance, 
and 4 percentage points for GDPpc. The effect of cultural and political distance, although non-
negligible, is not sufficient to eliminate the effect of foreignness. Even at the 95th percentile of the 
corresponding distributions, the probability of exit of foreign firm is still 0.23, while the 
corresponding probability of a similar domestic firm is 0.18.   
 
Table 24. Estimated Probabilites of Exit for Different Institutional Distances and Levels of GDPpc 
Percentiles 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
Cultural Distance 0.2987 0.2985 0.2835 0.2551 0.2258 
Political Distance 0.3041 0.2954 0.2831 0.2696 0.2309 





We re-ran the regressions reported in Table 24 including the number of firms held by 
citizens of each national community and its square to control for density effects. Neither the linear 
term alone nor the linear and quadratic terms were significant. The inclusion of these terms did not 
produce any significant change in the other results. A possible explanation for this lack of change is 
that the rationale provided by organizational ecologists for the effect of density is essentially of a 
time series nature, while in this study we have essentially cross-section variation. 
Some nationalities have a strong weight in our sample, and this may raise concerns that the 
results are driven by these nationalities. We ran the same regressions, excluding each of the largest 
communities: Brazil, United Kingdom, China, Spain, France, and Germany. Results did not change.  
To check if our result that foreign firms exit more than domestic was driven by some 
specific nationalities, we ran regressions similar to that whose results are displayed in column (1) of 
Table 20, but instead of having the foreign dummy we included two dummies: one that accounts for 
the specific effect of one nationality and the other that accounts for the effect of the remaining 
foreign nationalities. Such a model cannot be estimated for those nationalities for which there are 
very few exits, as the coefficient of the corresponding dummy cannot be identified in these cases, 
but we were able to estimate it for 31 out of the 38 nationalities. In 17 out of the 31 cases, the 
coefficient of the dummy was positive and significant. In another 9 cases, the coefficient was 
positive although not significant. In only 5 cases was the coefficient negative, but in these cases it 
was never statistically significant. This is evidence that our result is not driven by a small number of 
nationalities.  
We performed a similar exercise for groups of nationalities: owners from Portuguese 
speaking countries versus non-Portuguese speaking countries, owners from European Union 
countries versus non-EU countries, owners from countries whose income per capita is greater than 
Portugal’s versus those whose income per capita is lower.  Results in Table 25 indicate that 
foreigners from high income countries confront lower exit rates than those confronted by foreigners 
from low income countries, but higher than those confronted by the Portuguese (column 1). Those 
coming from a European Union country confront exit rates that are lower than those of foreigners 
from other countries, but higher than those confronted by the Portuguese (column 2). Finally, 
citizens from Portuguese speaking countries confront exit rates that are higher than those confronted 
by foreigners from other countries, which is evidence that language is not a sufficient advantage to 
compensate for other characteristics of the Portuguese speaking countries, possibly their lower 
income (column 3). 
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Table 25. Determinants of Foreign Exit: Groups of Countries 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Income greater than Portugal 0.328***     
 
(0.075) 














Portuguese speaking countries 
  
0.666*** 






   
(0.065) 
Log Likelihood -3454.831 -3457.307 -3452.633 
Notes: Sample includes and 6717 observations corresponding to 3175 firms. Regressions 
include the same control variables as in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance 
is indicated as follows:  * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.001 (two tailed tests). 
 
We also excluded firms with more than one owner and results did not show any significant 
changes. Results were also the same when we excluded entrepreneurs with no labor market 
experience and when we controlled for experience using a set of experience classes. To check 
whether the results might be contaminated by changes in immigration laws that changed in 2007, 
our regressions were run without those firms that were created during 2007. Results did not change. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate the differences in the probability of survival of firms created by 
foreign and domestic entrepreneurs to evaluate the extent to which foreign entrepreneurs suffer 
from a liability of foreignness. In addition, we study the impact of cultural and political distance 
between the home and the host country upon the probability of survival of firms created by 
foreigners of different origins.  
We find that after carefully controlling for characteristics of the entrepreneurs, firms, and 
industries, firms created by foreigners are 50% more likely to exit than comparable firms created by 
natives. Two reasons why foreigners may be disadvantaged relative to natives is that they may be 
less familiar with the local environment and they may suffer from a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of 
local economic agents. Experience in the country is likely to reduce these liabilities of foreignness, 
because over time individuals learn about the host economy and may become more accepted by 
locals. We find that the disadvantage of foreigners is clearly reduced for those who have been in the 
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host country for longer. In our sample, the average foreigner has an exit rate right upon his arrival 
in the country that is 75% higher than a local. Three years later this figure is around 43% and ten 
years later around 27%. 
We find that the survival prospects of firms created by foreign entrepreneurs are related to 
the distance between the institutional environments in home and host countries. While this distance 
may create additional hurdles to foreign entrepreneurs, it may also create opportunities that are 
more likely to be perceived if individuals come from countries that are quite different from the host 
country than if they come from countries that are similar. We account for both formal and informal 
institutions, measured respectively by political and cultural distance between Portugal and the 
country of origin of the foreigner entrepreneur. Our findings indicate that foreigners coming from 
countries that are culturally and politically more dissimilar from the host country are less likely to 
close their firms than those coming from countries that are relatively similar. We also find that 
firms created by those that come from wealthier countries are more likely to survive. This may be 
related to the fact that these individuals are more likely to have access to greater pools of resources 
and likely to be less severely cash constrained than those coming from poorer countries. Due to the 
attributes of our sample, we find it difficult to empirically discriminate between this effect and that 
of cultural distance. 
The result that firms originating from more distant countries may be in an advantageous 
position to spot and exploit opportunities that more embedded firms may neglect has been 
previously found in studies focusing on multinational firms. Our findings show that this applies to 
entrepreneurial firms as well. This is especially remarkable because these firms are not particularly 
sophisticated. This is also significant because the decision maker is clearly identified in our firms – 
and the country of origin of that decision maker matters.   
Our results indicate that firms that were created by foreigners show some reduction in the 
likelihood of exit over their first years in the market, but that the pace of this reduction is not 
significantly different from the reduction in exit that is experienced by firms created by domestic 
entrepreneurs. On the contrary, the previous experience of the foreign founder with the local 
environment critically affects the likelihood of survival of the new venture. This puts the individual 
in the center of the liabilities of foreignness that have been identified in the international business 
literature. For management in general the implication is that, when a firm is considering entering a 
new country, there may be important payoffs in choosing a management team with considerable 
knowledge of that country rather than relying mostly on the learning process that will occur after 
entry takes place. 
Our results have important implications for individuals who are considering entering 
entrepreneurship in foreign countries. Historically, immigrants have been typically attracted by 
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high-income countries (Harris & Todaro, 1970). This may hold for those seeking jobs as employees 
because wages are higher in such countries, and also for those looking for a place to start a 
business, because the purchasing power of the potential clients is higher and the potential gain from 
such ventures is greater than the corresponding potential gain in lower income countries. However, 
our finding that the survival of firms is substantially lower if the entrepreneur comes from a low-
income country indicates that these entrepreneurs may lack resources that are critical for the 
survival of their initiatives.  
This suggests that if an individual is considering different countries in which to start a firm, 
he/she would have to weigh the potential gain against the likelihood of not being able to obtain it, 
and he/she may be better off by choosing a low income country. And, indeed, in our sample we find 
that foreigners from countries whose incomes are higher than Portugal are not at all unusual and 
that these individuals have a higher propensity to start their own businesses than those from 
countries with lower income.  
If one is already in a foreign country and is considering starting his/her own business, he/she 
should be careful in evaluating whether he/she has access to the relevant resources required for 
running a business. In particular, one should be certain that one has adequate knowledge of the host 
economy and is seen by others as a legitimate business party. Petersen & Pedersen (2002) showed 
that foreign firms may improve their performance by actively seeking to learn about their host 
country, and foreigners considering going into entrepreneurship should consider this active learning 
strategy as well. This may be a strategy with an especially high payoff if one comes from a country 
that is considered to be similar to the host country. Similarity may create a false sense of comfort 
and may hinder learning about specificities of the host country which, in turn, may lead to failure. 
Entrepreneurs whose country of origin is politically and culturally more distant from the host 
country may also be at an advantage in identifying opportunities missed by natives or by those 
coming from countries that are more similar.  
Our results may also have implications for research on the internationalization of other types 
of firms, more specifically, on the impact of international experience of managers on the 
internationalization of firms. Sapienza, Autio, George, & Zahra (2006) posited that the international 
experience of managers can be a substitute for the lack of international experience of firms that 
wish to go into international markets.  Some studies have attempted to control for diversity of 
international experiences of managers (Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen 2001) and diversity of 
nationalities among management team members (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011). The learning from 
international experience may, however, be different depending on the country where it was 
obtained, and benefits of this learning may also depend on the country it is applied to. There may be 
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gains from extending this research in a direction that takes into account the institutional specificities 
of the countries where experience is gained and where this experience is put to work.  
Finally, our results will also speak to policy-makers because many countries pursue active 
policies designed to promote entrepreneurship and help entrepreneurs start their firms, and some of 
them have even implemented specific policy initiatives seeking to attract immigrants who wish to 
start a business there. Our results indicate that it may be useful to tailor the support provided to new 
businesses when the promoters are foreigners, especially by providing training that helps potential 
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